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What We Learned in
**PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
DURING THE WAR**

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WHAT WE LEARNED IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
DURING THE WAR.

LECTURES //

by

J. Donald Kingsley

William Anderson

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Neil Dalton

Charles S. Ascher

L. W. Hoelscher

Estes Kefauver

Herbert Emmerich

Graduate School //

U. S. Department of Agriculture .

Washington, D. C.

1949

OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
RELATING TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Elements of Personnel Administration. Lectures, with accompanying problems and discussions, by eight outstanding leaders in this field: Leonard D. White, Ordway Tead, John H. Williams, H. S. Person, W. J. Donald, F. A. Silcox, Herman Feldman, and W. W. Stockberger. 102 pages. Paper bound, 50¢. (1935)

Administrative Management. Lectures by ten outstanding leaders in the field of management: Ordway Tead, Richard S. Uhrbrock, H. S. Person, George Babcock, E. G. Draper, Edgar W. Smith, Robert B. Wolf, C. J. Hicks, Mrs. W. F. Greenough, and W. B. Donham. 108 pages. Cloth bound, \$1.00; paper bound, 75¢. (1938)

As I See It: Observations of a Civil Servant by Warner W. Stockberger. Fifty short essays on public administration, especially personnel administration, written by a man who was long known as the "dean of personnel administrators" in the Federal service. 50 pages. Paper bound, 35¢. (1941)

Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service. Lectures and papers by Donald C. Stone, Earl W. Loveridge and Peter Keplinger, W. L. Mitchell, and James W. Fesler. 60 pages. Paper bound, 35¢. (1942)

Lectures on Administrative Regulation. Lectures on regulation of private interests by Federal administrative agencies, by Ashley Sellers, Lloyd K. Garrison, C. W. Kitchen, Jacob Rosenthal, Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Fowler Harper, Paul H. Appleby, and Joseph B. Eastman. 80 pages. Paper bound, 50¢. (1945)

FOREWORD

This series of lectures, entitled *What We Learned in Public Administration During the War*, was given in the fall of 1946 under the sponsorship of the Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture. Experiences during the Second World War were then still fresh in the minds of men who had had a share in Federal administration during the war. The purpose of the series was to review those experiences and glean from them whatever might be of permanent value. The high cost of printing made publication of the lectures impossible at the time they were given. They are being published now for the first time.¹

The lessons of the war as they are brought out by these lectures are a mixture of old and new. They point out again and again that many of the principles of public administration which have long been recognized were found to hold just as valid under the severe test of war-time conditions as in peacetime. At the same time, a number of new ideas also developed. Mr. Gladieux's lecture, "Top Management in the War Agencies," is particularly interesting in this respect. He emphasizes the inseparability of policy and operations, the impossibility of divorcing the head of an agency from responsibility for its operations, and the unsatisfactory results of having too many layers between the head and the principal operating units (a consequence of too rigid application of the span-of-control dogma).

Mr. Kingsley's lecture on "Coordination of Wartime Programs" is a contribution of much importance. Recently a small group of heads of Federal operating

¹ The method of reproduction may be of some interest, particularly to administrators who have to make their printing funds go much further than before the war. The lectures were typed on proportional spacer typewriters, following usual book style, and multilithed. In making the photographic plates, the type was reduced 15 per cent. The right margins could have been justified, but this would have more than doubled the time required for typing.

bureaus were asked to indicate what they regarded as their major administrative problems. These officials put coordination and integration of programs and operations at the top of the list. As the Federal government becomes more complex, coordination of programs becomes increasingly important and necessary. There is probably no more difficult administrative problem. In view of the dearth of literature on the subject, Mr. Kingsley's lecture is doubly welcome.

Mr. Ascher's talk on "Washington-Field Relationships" lends support to many of the observations that were made in the series of lectures on Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service, published by the Graduate School in 1942. While circumstances were different and the building up of field staffs in the wartime agencies and the development of relationships with headquarters were enormously complicated by limitations of time, the problems as they appeared during the war were very much the same as during peacetime.

Representative (now Senator) Kefauver discusses the subject of relationships between Congress and the executive branch and explains his proposal for a report and question period in which Cabinet members and heads of agencies would appear on the floor of Congress. His summary of the effects of lack of information on the working relations of the two branches emphasizes a problem that is familiar to every administrator.

Professor Anderson reviews Federal-state relations during the war. He points out that centralization, in peace or in war, does not necessarily mean a weakening of the states but may, in fact, result in giving them additional functions and responsibilities at the same time that the national government expands.

Mr. Dalton tells the story of the wartime information programs. This may, at first, seem to be purely a wartime matter, but it should be read bearing in mind the continuing problem of letting the people know what their government is doing. The group of Federal bureau chiefs I mentioned earlier placed high on the list of major administrative problems the task of informing the public so as to enable it to understand what their bureaus are trying to accomplish.

Mr. Hoelscher discusses efforts to improve management and their application to peacetime. Some outstanding work was done in this direction during the war. One of the best-known examples was the operations of the Control Division of the Army Service Forces. A summary of a talk by Major General C. F. Robinson, Director of this division, is included as an appendix. The whole subject of management improvement programs during the war deserves careful analysis, and it would be helpful if the Society for Public Administration or some other group could arrange such a study.

Mr. Emmerich's lecture, while in the nature of a summary of the talks, adds many valuable and penetrating observations and is a very important contribution to the series.

We regret that it was not possible to include one of the lectures given in the series, which dealt with advances in personnel administration during the war. This, again, is an area where much was done and where a detailed study would be very helpful.

The titles of the lecturers are shown as they were at the time the lectures were given.

John Thurston
Chairman, Committee on Public
Administration Lectures



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TOP-LEVEL COORDINATION OF WARTIME PROGRAMS

by

J. Donald Kingsley

Deputy Director

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

The war saw the development in the executive branch of new machinery for top-level coordination and the development of new coordinating techniques. The lessons of the war have a bearing upon the problems of the organization and staffing of the Presidency in peacetime, and I propose to examine them largely in that light. I shall not, therefore, deal with the important and continuing coordinating functions of the Bureau of the Budget through the operations of its Estimates or Administrative Management Divisions. Instead, I shall concentrate upon what might appropriately be described as "operating policy coordination" during the war--the day-to-day contact on the part of the President and his aides with the policy decisions of the Federal agencies, resulting in a singleness of direction never before achieved.

The problem of coordination is inherent in the division of labor and in the functional specialization of society. To the extent that specialization of function is necessary, coordination is equally necessary. It is a mistake, therefore, to assume, as has sometimes been said, that a need for top-level coordination is a mark of poor organization. Rather, it is at bottom an index of the extent of specialization and of the consequent division of labor. As a problem, it cannot be avoided in a highly developed society nor in a mature institution, though its difficulties may be minimized by sound organization.

The problems of top-level coordination are particularly difficult in the Federal Government, not only because of its innate complexity and the high degree of specialization of its personnel but also because of the necessity of harmonizing and compromising the conflicting interests of such functionally divergent groups in our society as

employers and workers, civilians and military, farmers and consumers, and others you can readily name. Such harmonization is the most important function of top-level administration, just as it is of politics, and it takes place, in large part, through one or another of the processes we call coordination. I cannot overstress this, because it is the point on which some of the professional drawers of organization charts go astray. In dealing with top-level coordination, we are dealing with politics in the grand sense and with the integrative cement in our whole society. This is the real challenge of the Presidency and, in large measure, the challenge presented to a top-level coordinating staff.

The fundamentals of coordination of operations are no different in time of peace than in time of war. In a governmental machine as complex as that of the Federal Government, operating in a society as delicately integrated as our own, the need for central coordination of policies, programs, and activities is constant and pressing. In wartime, we can see this need more clearly because of the greater urgency and because our joint efforts are concentrated more nearly upon a single unifying objective. Wartime experience is thus likely to be especially useful as a basis for peacetime analysis, for its significant elements stand out more sharply and dramatically. I shall attempt, therefore, in this lecture to deal broadly with the perennial problems of top-level coordination, using our war experience for illustrative purposes only and as a basis for drawing certain general conclusions. As a matter of fact, I propose to make only four main points:

1. That these problems can never be finally solved by rearranging organizational patterns;
2. That coordination in the Federal Government can be achieved only through the President;
3. That he needs a specially qualified staff in the White House for this purpose; and
4. That this staff, by virtue of the nature of the problems with which it deals, is necessarily expendable.

Organization for the Coordination of Wartime Programs

I do not, of course, wish to imply that I believe our wartime organization was the best that could have been conceived or that wartime problems of coordination were not made more difficult by defects in organization. I have no doubt that a more rational organizational pattern was attainable. The structure of emergency agencies was jerry-built, and President Roosevelt had an incurable habit of neglecting to abolish one agency after it had been superseded by another.

I might observe parenthetically at this point, however, that a case can be made for the inevitable confusion which ensued. There is much to be said for friendly competition in ideas and for the forging of major policies in the heat engendered by the conflict of competing agencies. A straight-line organization is not always the most efficient in the long run, as our current investigations of the organization of the German war effort are beginning to make clear. Certainly the problems we confronted were very great, for we were undertaking to coordinate not only the activities of a group of Federal agencies but, through them, those of our whole socioeconomic system. Conflict, therefore, was not only unavoidable but, for believers in the democratic process, even desirable.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that we came to a real centralization of coordination only with the creation of the Office of War Mobilization after we had been formally at war for eighteen months. Under our constitutional system, the President alone is in a position to exercise central direction and control--and the President alone should be in that position. The reluctance of Mr. Roosevelt to set up an Assistant President is, therefore, readily understandable and he stood upon firm constitutional grounds in opposing as long as possible the creation of a top-level coordinating office with independent statutory powers. The Office of War Mobilization was unquestionably established by him in an effort to prevent Congressional creation of a statutory agency which would have formally meant the dissipation of the Presidential powers. When, ultimately, legislation could no longer be staved off and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was

created by the Congress, the President met the challenge presented to his constitutional position by informal means and by the designation as its head of a close political associate.

But I am getting ahead of my story. For more than two years prior to the creation of the Office of War Mobilization by Executive order, the Administration had been stumbling toward such a development and there had been constant clamor in Congress and in the press for it. The first real step toward the organized coordination and guidance of the economy for war purposes had been taken in May, 1940, when the President revived the Council of National Defense, provided for under a statute of 1916 which had not been repealed. This statute permitted the President to appoint an Advisory Commission on National Defense, with the President as its head. Mr. Roosevelt accordingly appointed seven members to the Commission--William S. Knudsen, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Sidney Hillman, Chester C. Davis, Ralph Budd, Leon Henderson, and Miss Harriet Elliott. William McReynolds, one of the President's administrative assistants, served as secretary. The Commission was organized in divisions covering industry, agriculture, transportation, manpower, finance, prices, and consumer interests.

It is not necessary to seek far to discover why this particular organizational pattern was adopted. We were, in the first place, backing into the war and it was more than a matter of convenience for the President to establish an organization which required no additional legislation. In the second place, as I have already indicated, Mr. Roosevelt was consistently reluctant to relinquish Presidential control of the mobilization effort. An Advisory Commission which he personally headed could in no way impair this control. But that fact also meant that the actual job of coordination remained exclusively in the President's hands and, as mobilization progressed, the burden which this entailed necessarily proved a serious weakness.

In the fall of 1940, widespread agitation for a central war organization began in the Congress. Senator Taft introduced a bill to create a War Resources Administration, patterned closely upon the recommendations in the Industrial Mobilization Plan, which had been buried by the

President in 1939. Mr. Roosevelt reacted in a typical fashion to the challenge presented by the Taft Bill and to the general feeling in the Congress by establishing the Office of Production Management by Executive Order on January 7, 1941. The Office of Production Management was located within the Executive Office of the President.

The year 1941 marked the transition from defense to a full war economy and it was in this period that a semblance of centralized direction was first achieved. In creating the Office of Production Management, the President undertook to answer those who objected to the Advisory Commission because it had no chairman and no head other than the President. He was, however, still unwilling to place a single individual in charge of the whole program. In appointing Messrs. Hillman and Knudsen as codirectors, Mr. Roosevelt gave full recognition to the role of major functional groups in the administration of the war effort, retaining in his own hands full responsibility for the conciliation of differences between management and labor. In announcing the establishment of the Office of Production Management, the President described the new organization as one in which all three elements in the defense program--labor, management, and the armed forces--would be equally represented.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the President's action in creating what many regarded as a dual-headed monstrosity. I would again point out, however, that we were embarked upon a total mobilization involving the resolution of fundamental conflicts of interest within our society and that the resolution of such conflicts is the essence not only of high policy but of the whole political process. In this light, the reluctance of the President to delegate the functions of conciliation to a third party is readily understandable and wholly defensible.

The Office of Production Management had broad powers to formulate plans for mobilization of the productive facilities of the Nation and to take all lawful steps necessary to insure an adequate supply of materiel. It did not have the power to determine military or other requirements or to place contracts or purchase supplies. The military branches were still free to determine their own requirements--subject only to a veto by the President--and to conduct their own supply activities.

When the functions of the Advisory Commission on National Defense were transferred to the Office of Production Management, the Price Stabilization Division was left high and dry, as was Miss Elliott's Consumer Protection Division. These were consolidated through another Executive order in an Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply. The new agency was given responsibility for price control and for the distribution of civilian supplies. There was thus created for the first time an agency to represent the civilian interests as opposed to the military--the two dominant opposed interests in a war program. Since all supplies came from the same national source, a basis for conflict between the Office of Production Management and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply existed from the start. The conflict first emerged over programs for cut-backs in civilian production and control over civilian priorities. This led to a series of conferences between Leon Henderson and Knudsen, who finally reached an agreement as to a division of responsibility for priorities. The Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was to take the initiative when civilian industries were involved and the Office of Production Management to take it in respect to war industries.

This was one of the first clear examples of a coordinating process soon to become widely recognized in Washington--something which might be called coordination by treaty. The conflicting agencies worked out through a process of bargaining a solemn agreement covering phases of their respective activities.

An Executive Order embodying the agreement was drawn up and presented to the President for his signature. Instead of signing it, however, he dumped the whole problem into the lap of his Special Counsel, Judge Samuel Rosenman. As a result, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board was created in August, 1941. This was a top-level policy group under the chairmanship of Vice President Wallace, with Donald Nelson as Executive Director, and was composed of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Director General and Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management, and Messrs. Henderson and Harry Hopkins. It was in effect a Cabinet committee, established for the purpose of settling

disputes over the distribution of resources as between the civilian and military phases of the economy. At the same time, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply was split up and Mr. Henderson was appointed Director of a Civilian Supply Division within the Office of Production Management.

The creation of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board provided for the first time machinery for the review of total economic requirements. However, the lines of authority were now very tangled. As Division Directors in the Office of Production Management, Nelson, Hillman, and Henderson were coordinate, but as Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management, Hillman had authority over both. Hillman and Henderson were, again, coordinate as members of the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board, in which capacity Henderson could help to overrule any decision the Office of Production Management might make in respect to his Civilian Supply Division.

In addition to these defects, duplication of function between the Army and Navy Munitions Board and the Office of Production Management continued to be a source of friction. The situation was perhaps tolerable for defense preparations, but not for war. The day before Pearl Harbor, Senator Kilgore introduced a bill to centralize administration of the war effort under a new Cabinet officer. Events of the following day made a change in the organization of the war effort inevitable, and on January 16, 1942, the President signed an Executive Order creating the War Production Board, under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald Nelson. The Board was composed of much the same personnel as the expired Supply Priorities and Allocation Board. It was given, however, a broader grant of authority and the records leave little doubt that the President was at last reconciled to the necessity of delegating some of his most important powers and that he meant the War Production Board to be a real central agency. The Board was to exercise general direction over the entire war procurement and production program and all Federal departments and establishments were ordered to comply with the directives of the Chairman. There was thus created for the first time a central agency with direct power over all other Federal departments. No sooner had such

centralization been achieved, however, than decentralization again set in. It has been said of Mr. Nelson that he had three outstanding characteristics--patience, patience, and patience--and it is unquestionably true that Mr. Nelson's personality and his deep-seated belief in what can be called called "coordination by consent" had much to do with the dissipation in the ensuing months of the authority originally conferred upon the War Production Board.

The first and perhaps most crucial decision made by Mr. Nelson was that the procurement power should remain with the Services. There has been considerable controversy as to the basis for this decision. It was true, as Mr. Nelson pointed out at the time, that the armed forces had trained procurement personnel which it would have taken some time for the War Production Board to duplicate. It is also undoubtedly true that Mr. Bernard Baruch advised Mr. Nelson never to let anyone not in uniform sign a contract and Mr. Nelson was understandably impressed with this advice, surrounded as he was with dollar-a-year men and other representatives of industry. But whatever the reason for the decision, it led to a series of actions which resulted in the virtual end of the War Production Board as the sole coordinating agency. Mr. Nelson now entered into a series of "treaties" with the War and Navy Departments. This attempt at coordination by consent failed to solve the problems and, with increasing frequency, disputes ended in the White House. The numerous conflicts which had to be taken to the White House for settlement demonstrated to all the world that Mr. Nelson was not, in fact, supreme on the mobilization front. The bitter struggle which ensued between the military and the War Production Board came to be popularly known as the "Battle of Washington."

In the course of this epic struggle, an interesting experiment was made which might be characterized as coordination by infiltration. The Army and Navy Munitions Board reported to the President through the War Production Board Chairman. Representatives of the Army and Navy Munitions Board now moved directly into the industry branches of the Division of Industry Operations. Eventually, Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, moved over to the War

Production Board himself. But even this did not work. The conflicts were too sharp to be reconciled by consent and the battle between Mr. C. E. Wilson and Mr. Eberstadt became notorious. Coordination had still to be achieved by the President alone.

Additional illustrations of the tendency of the War Production Board to permit a dissipation of its central authority can be given. In 1942 the War Manpower Commission was created as a separate agency, after Mr. Nelson had decided against its establishment within the War Production Board. As manpower shortages became severe in the final years of the war, a new source of agency conflict was thus created. Similarly, Mr. Nelson permitted the establishment of separate "czars" for petroleum, food, shipping, and rubber. These, in turn, represented responses to pressures from major interest groups.

In less than a year, Mr. Nelson had lost his status as supreme head of the war economy. The inevitable result, in view of the increasing burdens upon the President, came in October, 1942, when the Office of Economic Stabilization was created by Executive Order. Mr. Byrnes, its first Director, was a powerful political personage in his own right and with the establishment of his office in the East Wing of the White House, all question as to who was top man in the mobilization effort was ended. From the moment of Mr. Byrnes' appointment, we really had a coordinator who spoke for the President. The creation of the Office of War Mobilization in May, 1943, was primarily designed to head off legislation and was not due to any pressing need. From the time of Mr. Byrnes' appointment, although the organization of the executive branch remained the same, disputes were resolved, programs coordinated, and central direction established.

It is interesting to speculate as to why this should have been the case. The grant of authority to Mr. Byrnes was little more sweeping than that which had been accorded Mr. Nelson. As in so many other cases of leadership, the important factors are probably of a subtlety not revealed by administrative analysis. I believe, however, that several points contributing to Mr. Byrnes' success can be identified.

He regarded himself, first of all, as purely a policyman and scrupulously refused all attempts to encumber himself

with operating responsibilities. The War Production Board failed as a central coordinating agency partly because it had a vested interest in certain of the operating programs it was charged with coordinating.

Second, Mr. Byrnes regarded no agency as outside his jurisdiction and he quickly established his precedence by moving quickly and quietly into the areas of major dispute.

Third, he dealt only with major matters and maintained an aloofness from ordinary operating details.

Fourth, he was a man of political stature in his own right.

Finally and of supreme importance, he was known to speak for the President. His closeness to the President was shrewdly dramatized by the location of his office in the White House itself.

The history of coordinating activities in the course of war mobilization is much too complex to be treated in the course of a lecture. I have done little more in the foregoing than to sketch in the skeleton of that history. What I am more concerned with is the question of what lessons, if any, can be drawn from all this.

Lessons of Our War Experience

I have indicated my belief that our organization for war mobilization left much to be desired. I have tried, however, to indicate that the weaknesses in organization were due, in large part, to a fundamental political problem and to the existence of important divergent interest groups in our society. Our successful mobilization for war was, in large measure, the result of our success in reconciling and harmonizing these divergent groups. Inevitably, every major pressure in the Nation is reflected in the administrative structure and problems in Washington.

The inescapable problem of how to achieve unity was rendered more acute by the fact that we backed into the war and by the personality of the President. But the problem could in no way have been avoided.

It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which some of our difficulties might have been minimized by the consolidation of the various war agencies into a single

department for war mobilization along the lines of the Kilgore-Tolan proposals. I personally doubt that such an approach would have provided any better solution. The significance of the Eberstadt-Wilson struggle within the War Production Board would appear to be that when strongly competing interests are reflected in the Government, their conflict cannot be eliminated by organizational devices.

To be sure, there could have been considerable improvement. Many conflicts might have been avoided had the labor supply and production agencies been combined, for there was between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board no real cleavage of interest. In general, however, there is much to be said for the representation of strong divergent interests in separate agencies, with responsibility for their coordination resting in the White House.

It is also interesting to inquire whether a war cabinet--suggested by many--could have done the job. Again, it seems to me that our experience during the war years points toward a negative answer to this question. The Supply Priorities and Allocations Board was for all practical purposes a war cabinet. But it could not solve the fundamental conflicts involved.

Why was coordination so poor in the first two years? The answer, I think, is to be sought in two directions. In the first place, national unity was achieved only after Pearl Harbor. In the second place, the President alone can effect such coordination when basic questions are involved, and he was inadequately staffed for this purpose. What Mr. Byrnes did for the first time was to provide the President with an adequate coordinating staff, although Harry Hopkins had previously operated successfully over a part of the field.

I think it is possible to draw from this wartime experience some general principles respecting top-level coordination. While many observations might be made, I shall restrict myself to four:

1. The coordinating agency should not have operating responsibilities, as the War Production Board had, or fiscal obligations, as the Bureau of the Budget has. To the extent that an agency is also operating, its head loses

status as a coordinator. To the extent that it is engaged in fiscal control, its motives become suspect. Top-level coordination requires, moreover, an entirely different type of personnel than an operating situation. It requires persons skilled in the art of negotiation and conciliation and in the detection of incipient problems.

2. The top-level coordinator has to speak for the President. For this reason, authority can never be delegated below the Director's office. Nor should the coordinator be just a member of the President's Cabinet since Cabinet members are among those he has to coordinate. Since his success depends upon his being an alter ego for the President, it is desirable that he have no independent statutory powers.

3. The coordinator should deal with relatively few problems at this level. If small problems are handled, status is lost. He should pick and choose the problems with which he deals. While coordination by consent can be carried too far, the number of things which should be imposed should be kept as small as possible. Coordination is an area in which authority is dissipated by direct use.

4. Timing is the most important single ingredient in successful coordination. If the coordinator moves in too soon, there is resentment and loss of initiative at the lower level; if too late, he finds himself in a crisis or confronted with entrenched public positions. It is easier to achieve coordination at the time of policy development rather than later.

I have said nothing about the more mechanical techniques of coordination, such as the requiring of reports. These have been sufficiently dealt with elsewhere and I regard them, in any event, as distinctly secondary to what can be called the broad strategy of coordination.

A Look at the Future

The need for top-level coordination and a White House staff to effectuate it does not end with the war and reconversion periods. We need to examine carefully the staffing and the organization of the Presidency in the light of present-day postwar requirements.

It is a matter of grave concern that the organization and staffing of the American Presidency in peacetime have failed to keep pace with the evolution of its functions and requirements. As the disparity between the demands placed upon the President and his means to meet them constantly increases, we face the ultimate possibility of the kind of governmental collapse which overtook France, when there was "apoplexy at the center and paralysis at the extremities."

An approach was made to this matter in 1937 by the President's Committee on Administrative Management. Unfortunately, both the frame of reference within which the Committee operated and the focus of its interest were too exclusively centered upon the executive and managerial functions of the President. The members of the Committee viewed the President primarily in his role as Chief Executive, with only a sidelong glance at his role of Chief Legislator, or of party leader. This astigmatism resulted in recommendations which, while of great importance, failed to touch the most pressing questions and placed an altogether false emphasis upon management.

The Presidency as presently permanently organized is deficient in at least three major directions:

1. It has, first of all, no adequate permanent machinery to assist the President in fulfilling his responsibility for the formulation of overall governmental policy. While the people and the Congress look to him for leadership in the development and presentation of national programs, and while, in the same manner, he is expected to formulate and present the national program of the majority party, he is not equipped to assume such leadership. In short, what is badly needed is a unit to maintain constant contact with the whole range of governmental activity and to furnish the President with such advice and assistance as he personally may require in this respect. The function such a staff would perform is one aspect of coordination.

This lack is especially serious because, under our constitutional system, no other branch of the Government is in a position to speak for the Nation as a whole nor to provide that unity of direction without which any

modern constitutional system must fail. The Congress, even as reorganized, is unable to take the lead in this matter. The necessities of Congressional organization and operation, the committee system, and the essential localism of the members of Congress lead that body to take a piecemeal and atomized view of public policy. We are in constant danger, therefore, of adopting conflicting or irreconcilable proposals. That danger has more than once materialized.

2. The President has, secondly, no adequate machinery for the coordination of policy formulation and implementation in the executive branch itself. This is due in part, perhaps, to the growth of governmental functions and agencies not represented in the Cabinet. Insofar as this is the case, proper administrative reorganization can reduce the size of the problem. But the deficiency is certainly more largely due to limitations in the organization of the Cabinet itself and in its lack of staffing.

3. The third major inadequacy relates to the means at the disposal of the President for exercising his role as leader of his party and of the Congress. It is clear that responsible government is party government and that party management is a principal means by which the unification of the government is to be achieved. Moreover, the party is the one continuing link between the President and the Congress and the one instrument through which a coherent national program can be effectuated. With adequate party management--and only with it--can the difficulties of the separation of powers be overcome and effective government provided.

4. If we measure the staffing and organizational requirements of the Presidency in its policy aspects against the proposals of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, we can see how far short of adequacy those recommendations fell. They dealt, in fact, with only one of the three major facets of the presidential office, the administrative-managerial. To the extent that they recognized at all the role of the President as originator of policy or as party leader, they attempted to compress such functions within a limited managerial framework. Thus they consigned to the Bureau of the Budget, which should be the managerial arm of the

President, some policy development functions which do not properly pertain to a fiscal agency. And they equipped the President with a group of administrative assistants in the fields of personnel, fiscal, and organizational management who by all odds should function within the Bureau of the Budget. At the same time, they failed to provide for staff which could assist the President in coordinating the executive branch at the policy level (as clearly distinct from the managerial), or could assist him in the development and formulation of a broad Administration program.

In this connection, the experience of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion has been highly instructive, for this office has provided, on an emergency basis, at least a partial answer to the problem. What is clearly required, and what the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion provided, is a White House staff in sufficiently intimate contact with the day-to-day operation of the executive agencies at the policy level to enable it to take the initiative in fitting together into a single mosaic the diversified policies under consideration by the departmental staffs. Thus, to the extent that it has functioned, the Office in a single operation has brought about coordination of the departments and the formulation of unified Administration programs.

There have been, however, serious defects in the manner in which the staff of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion has been geared into the Presidential office. It has not, for example, provided an adequate staff basis in a continuing fashion for the work of the Cabinet and it has not operated uniformly over the whole range of Federal policy.

It may be asked why the Cabinet does not provide adequate machinery for policy development and coordination. If one who has viewed its operations from outside may judge, this impotency is related in large measure to the absence of a foundation of staff work upon which the Cabinet might base its deliberations. As a group, its members are interested primarily in the operations of their own departments and they are inclined to use a Cabinet meeting as a means of clearing departmental business or of settling petty departmental disputes.

When, sporadically, they come together to consult and advise on great problems of state, they approach their task without adequate preparation and with no better basis than is provided by a consideration of the specific problems with which their own staffs have been concerned.

A similar structural weakness was, for many years, evident in the operations of the British Cabinet. That body was raised to its present effectiveness as a policy instrument primarily through the development of a Cabinet secretariat. The creation of the office of Secretary to the Cabinet was, in fact, one of the major English constitutional developments of the last one hundred years. It has been instrumental in the unification of the British system and the office serves, in fact, as the connecting link between the developmental work of the permanent staffs and the final formulation of policy by the political officers. By providing a basis for unity at the top, it assures coordination and singleness of purpose throughout the administrative structure.

Some similar development in our own system is imperative if we are to secure that coordination without which we are likely to have chaos in this complex world.

One additional word should be said on the subject of a White House coordinating staff. Such a staff is necessarily expendable. The type of assistance the President can receive from a permanent professional staff, he receives in large measure from the technicians of the Bureau of the Budget. What is involved here, in contrast, is essentially political within the strict and ancient meaning of the term. Such a staff cannot, therefore, anticipate surviving a party turnover any more than can the members of the Cabinet. High policy formulation and coordination are the very essence of politics and the staff which engages in them is necessarily expendable. It is the political element which distinguishes top-level coordination from all other varieties of the species.

TOP MANAGEMENT IN THE WAR AGENCIES

by

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I am happy to be here with you this evening and wish to take the opportunity of commending the Graduate School for initiating this series of conferences on the general subject of administration in wartime. The subject is extremely appropriate at this time. We are already beginning to lose some of the war perspective, and it is well that we capture such experience while still fresh in our minds.

Never was top management so important in government as during the war. The success of war administration was peculiarly dependent upon the leadership furnished by topside because of the need for establishing programs and developing techniques of administration, initially at least, with little precedent or experience as a guide. In contrast, old-line agencies tend to have their policies generally well set and their procedures fairly well grooved, and to some extent, regardless of the top administrator, the program goes along its accustomed channels. That was not the case in the war agencies. They were uniquely dependent upon the leadership furnished by the top administrator.

My principal thesis this evening is simply a reaffirmation of a basic principle in public administration recognized long before the war. It is simply this: A clear statement of purpose, adequate authority, sound organization, and effective personnel are the indispensable ingredients of good administration. That has been said many times in many different ways by many different people. My purpose here is to underline it in terms of war experience.

Effective Personnel

The paramount requirement during the war was a sufficient supply of good administrators. I think it might be well in this connection to explore briefly the kinds of people that proved to be good administrators in the various war agencies. In my view, the good administrators proved to be those who understood the art and psychology of human relations; who were able to reconcile conflicting points of view between different organizations and people; who were tough-fibered in effecting compromises on methods but not on objectives; and who led through competence and understanding rather than through fiat and dictation. The emphasis was on getting things done, and this, above all, called for skill in human relations.

Technical knowledge and skills, as far as top management was concerned, proved to be of secondary importance. Many times the specialist demonstrated his limitations in top management. Frequently people with specialized skills who had been in one field of activity all their professional lives were not able to adapt themselves to the broader demands of general administration.

In general, the best war administrators with the requisite qualifications in terms of human relations and leadership capacities came from private business and from public life. The businessmen who came into the Government generally (though not always) brought great energy and executive capacity to war tasks, but sometimes lacked the flexibility needed to adjust to a strange political environment. They were often not at home dealing with matters of important social and political policy, which were frequently involved in administrative considerations. Budget controls and Civil Service regulations understandably irked them, and they sometimes fretted under critical Congressional review of their policies and individual actions. Nevertheless, they brought a much-needed drive and business "know how" to the war effort.

High public officials, that is, officials already in the Government, generally fitted well into the role of war administrators. The main problem was that there just

weren't enough topside Government administrators of sufficient stature to go around among the war jobs. Sometimes the Government people proved to be a bit inhibited by the traditions and practices of normal Federal administration, but generally they were used to dealing with broad economic and social problems on a national scale. Their horizons and sights were generally higher, and they were able to get along as public administrators in a political atmosphere.

The war taught us that our topside administrators were expendable as well as soldiers and machines. Men such as Knudsen, Henderson, and others, were consumed by the early pressures and exigencies of wartime administration. Frequently, one or two good administrators would be used up before the particular administration of a war program achieved stability and relative success.

I recall very well a remark Wayne Coy made in the early war days, when he pointed out that war administrators were in a kind of relay race. He didn't expect to see any top administrator who started out with a wartime agency outlast the program. He assumed, quite properly, that one good man would come in, make his contribution, butt his head against problems which seemingly defied resolution, solve some, not solve others, and finally pass on the baton to someone else who would carry it another lap. In just that way Nelson carried on from where Knudsen left off, and Krug built on Nelson's accomplishments; Bowles built on Henderson's; Crowley on Perkins', and so on. It was inevitable that few of the topside administrators who initiated these programs or originally headed these agencies outlasted them, and this in spite of the fact that many of the original administrators were men of greater ability than their successors.

Clear Purpose

Going on to the matter of purpose and objectives: A clear statement of purpose universally understood inside and outside the Government was an important prerequisite of successful administration by any war agency.

There were two or three outstanding examples of a clear statement of purpose for a war agency. The Rubber Director, for example, had one of the most definite directives from the President. He had a report behind him that was clear and concise, and the Executive Order that was issued told the Rubber Director in precise terms exactly what to do, how he was expected to do it, and what his objectives were.

Unfortunately, during the early days of the war it was not to be expected that anyone would have had the experience, insight, or foresight to project the war organization and develop full, realistic, and lasting statements of the functions and purposes of the various war agencies. We had never encountered problems of such magnitude and complexity before. Furthermore, the pattern of the war effort in the future could not be foreseen with any exactitude, and the nature of the problems was constantly shifting. We therefore had to follow in large part a basis of trial and error, with experience finally showing the way.

This process was costly and time-consuming in terms of war preparation. For example, we went from the National Defense Advisory Commission to the Office of Production Management, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, and finally the War Production Board. It represented groping in many ways. Out of the same kind of process evolved the Office of War Information from the Division of Information of the Office of Emergency Management, the Office of Facts and Figures, and the Overseas Branch of the Coordinator of Information.

In the cases of other agencies the definition was easy. The Office of Censorship, for example, had a purpose and objective which was fairly simple to state. Its success can, at least in part, be ascribed to that fact. On the other hand, the establishment of a Board of Economic Warfare proved much more difficult. We didn't have a very clear understanding of the nature of economic warfare back in 1940, and this caused initially much groping around to see just what our objectives and purposes were.

Unless the personnel of an agency, not only at the top, but at the bottom, understand the goal toward which they are striving and what objectives are in mind, their efforts

frequently run at cross purposes and the well-known bureaucratic confusion results. This was one of the major deficiencies in the war structure.

No matter how clear a statement of purpose was written, we found in the war experience that the critical step in carrying out the generalized objectives of a war agency came in the conversion of purpose into terms of action programs and specific objectives. For example, it was fairly easy to state the objective of increasing war production in an Executive Order. It was also fairly easy from that major purpose to determine that one of the ways to increase war production was to place restrictions on the allocation and use of materials like steel, copper, and aluminum. The next steps, however, posed the real problems: What specific control techniques do you work out, what allocation programs do you inaugurate, and how do you schedule production? Likewise, it was fairly simple to set out a purpose or objective saying, "This agency shall inform the world of our war objectives"; but the translation of that purpose of war information into terms of magazine content, broadcasting programs, airplane leaflets, and so on, was something else again.

The solution of these program problems generally measured the success of top management in wartime. It served as a testing ground for top management in that these new programs had to be formulated generally without precedent or experience as a guide and called for the highest of program imagination and administrative ingenuity. Fundamental to it all was a clear purpose and objective.

Adequate Authority

The war gave us a new concept of the need for clear and adequate authority by law or by Executive Order to perform a given purpose. Many an able administrator during the war ended up on the rocks of jurisdictional dispute and bureaucratic frustration because he found his authority inadequate or the field already covered by some other agency. An example of that was the old National

Defense Advisory Commission. It had practically no authority and what little it had was ill-defined. Its early demise was inevitable.

In drafting documents delegating authority to war administrators, frequently much reliance was placed on the factors of cooperation with other agencies and the use of liaison techniques when rather sticky problems of relationships and overlapping jurisdictions arose. Cooperation was fine, but someone in each case has to be designated in each field as having the authority to say, "This is final." We didn't fully understand this business of power and authority in the early war days. The failure to understand its nature in developing the war program was, I believe, very costly to top management. Under emergency conditions, when time and manpower were at a premium, adequate authority with full backing of the Chief Executive was the only answer.

Many war administrators learned the lesson of authority the hard way. Others properly refused to accept an assignment until the matter of authority was ultra-clear. When Donald Nelson was designated by the President as head of the War Production Board the question of authority immediately arose. There were some who felt that it was going too far to grant powers of economic life and death and full authority over Army and Navy production to the Chairman of the War Production Board. Mr. Nelson, quite properly, I believe, made it clear that if he were not vested with sufficient authority to carry this immense burden, he could not in conscience accept responsibility for war production. He won his point, and there was accordingly written into the Executive Order the greatest grant of economic authority ever reposed in one person in the history of this country. And in view of later developments it was well for the country that he insisted as he did. Perhaps the frustrations that were the lot of William Knudsen in the Office of Production Management and Leon Henderson in the Office of Price Administration (before price control legislation was enacted) were rather clearly in Mr. Nelson's mind at the time.

A similar incident arose in establishing the Office of War Information. When Elmer Davis was selected by the

President, it was suggested that he look over the Executive Order establishing the agency to make sure that it met his wishes and requirements. He asked only that one word be changed. It had to do with the matter of his authority over the publications and informational releases of the other agencies of the Government. Mr. Davis insisted that the word "binding" be substituted and inserted to make absolutely clear the authority of his directives. You will find that word "binding" in that particular Executive Order--I think it is the only place it was ever used. It was a good word and perhaps we should have used it more under similar circumstances where we wanted to be sure to give adequate authority to get a job done.

Organization for Planning and Policy Formulation

Top management also learned much about planning and policy formulation as the result of the war experience. First of all, we were forced to learn that policy is seldom developed in a vacuum. In the war agencies, particularly during the early period of development under pressure and without precedents or much time, all too often policy resulted from operating decisions rather than through mature consideration by topside committees or special policy staffs. For example, the question of economic policy vis-a-vis Portugal was too likely to be settled, initially at least, on the basis of an operating decision on the case of an exporter who wished to ship tin plate for the packing of sardines. Price policy was frequently set by action on specific applications for exceptions. Similarly, priority policy might be set by action in the Steel Division on specific allocations of that scarce commodity.

We learned, accordingly, that organization and administration are the means by which we formulate policy as well as the means by which we carry it out. Normally we think of it in reverse. The problem became one of assuring that these operating decisions fell into some kind of consistent policy pattern. That wasn't easy, and the remedies were not always adequate.

First of all, after a great deal of rather frustrating experience, it was realized that operators, that is the action people down the line, must be selected who were conscious of the implications and policy effects of individual actions and who had the foresight to anticipate the need for careful policy consideration before pressures forced them to make a perhaps unwise operating decision. More important, however--and this was recognized only after a period of rather hit-and-miss policy formulation and inadequate planning--most of the war agencies came to understand and realize the importance of an adequate planning and policy staff as a right arm of top administration. Planning came to be recognized as an essential part of the administrative process not only before the operation was undertaken but also as it progressed. While it was desired that top operators participate in this planning--because, as I have said, policy frequently resulted from operations--it was more important that a well-organized staff be set up with clear authority to delve into any aspect of operation and policy.

The outstanding example of such a staff was the War Production Board Planning Committee. The success of our war production owes much to that group. Before others really understood the magnitude of the war effort, this group raised the sights and through sheer competence, insight, and understanding influenced these in authority to set production objectives commensurate with the magnitude of the war effort.

Organization Techniques

I now wish to mention one or two organization problems and techniques which were high-lighted by war administration. The early misconception about the essential unity of policy and operations and their interacting character led to several not entirely successful attempts to establish the concept of an operating deputy who would have charge of operations, leaving to the head of the agency only policy functions. The most outstanding example of this was the War Production Board, where the Chairman tried to limit himself to policy functions only

and to assign all operating responsibilities to an Executive Vice Chairman.

This plan did not prove successful. The Chairman found that he could not fully divest himself of responsibility for supervision of operations, and in practice had to concern himself with many operating matters. War agencies in general were seldom sufficiently stabilized to permit split responsibilities of this kind. Since policy tended in large part to grow out of operations, the effect of such a rigid separation of the two as was attempted in the War Production Board was to leave the head of the agency too far removed from operating problems. Such a close tie-in to current activities was necessary in order to give realism to his policy decisions. At the same time it also frequently placed the operating deputy in the anomalous position of really handling both policy and operations.

I don't mean to infer that at no time is a deputy required. Every administrator must have some kind of a deputy to act in his absence, if for no other reason. I simply challenge the attempt to make a more or less artificial separation between policy and operations and to assume that the top administrator can relieve himself of operating responsibilities through the deputy device. In war agencies particularly, the head of the agency had to be not only the policy chief but the chief operator as well. He needed and used deputies and staff to assist him in performing this heavy burden, but in the final analysis there could be only one boss of the organization, and on him reposed full responsibility for administrative success.

Top management during wartime was continually engrossed in a struggle for time; time to plan, time to develop broad policies, time to review operations, time to direct and control the organization, and especially time to see the stream of officials and visitors. This led to many devices and techniques to free topside management from all but topside matters. One of the devices, not wholly successful, was the concept of the operating deputy mentioned above. Other efforts took the direction of reducing the number of officials reporting to the administrator. While such reduction in the "span of control" frequently had a valid purpose, all too often its adminis-

trative benefits were vitiated by the resultant "organization layering." This was the tendency to bury the units which actually did the operating work under a whole series of supervisors and coordinators who contributed little to the end result except to reduce the span of control at the top.

At one time in the War Production Board there were seven operating layers between the Chairman and the heads of the important commodity units which were the backbone of production operations. The only advantage of this set-up was that theoretically only five or six people supposedly reported to the Chairman. In practice, however, it completely fell down because it was found that the chiefs of these major operating units brought up matters of such policy importance and operating complexity that the intermediate layers were of little help. The formal channels were, therefore, frequently short-cut and the chief of the Steel Division, for example, soon was dealing directly with the Chairman. At one time or another, the Chairman of the War Production Board--and I don't think this was unique--had about twenty people reporting directly to him. Before the war I would have said that was poor organization. I don't think that necessarily true any longer. There is no set formula. Maybe five is all right for one agency; twenty may be best for a different agency and different people.

My own experience in this field leads me to believe that the most successful form of top-management organization consisted of a single operating and policy chief at the top, with a staff of special assistants on administration, planning, and policy to aid him in handling general fields as well as special assignments on a horizontal basis, and with operations organized vertically, the top operators having direct access to the chief administrator.

Summary

In summary, it may be said that good men seldom survived poor organization or inadequate authority. On the other hand, poor personnel seldom made a success of

the most perfect organization with the most crystal-clear purpose. No single pattern of operations worked for all purposes. It was demonstrated again and again that public administration is a dynamic business, and the method of organization, the kind of personnel, and the administrative techniques employed are all interacting and must be adjusted to one another and to the specific purpose to be served.

WASHINGTON-FIELD RELATIONSHIPS

by

Charles S. Ascher
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Organizing Wartime Programs

The war saw an enormous proliferation of Federal agencies that had a different relationship to the citizen than many prewar departments. The prewar agencies with field organizations were concerned chiefly with the administration of grants-in-aid to carry on educational or welfare programs. In so-called normal times, if you wanted to start a new type, say, of conservation program, you would give yourselves a three-months head start. You would recruit, you would train, you would send out flying squads to regional centers, you would bring people in for indoctrination, you would set up a fanfare with advance dates for publicity for the new program, and you would arrange for the use of all existing machinery for an introduction to the public. With this preparation you would have gotten your new program off to a good start.

The rationing of tires in the United States was set up between Pearl Harbor and Christmas, 1941. In just three weeks somebody had to think through, organize, and get into action the control of civilians in the purchase and use of automobile tires all over the nation. Folk look back nostalgically to those days when you could begin a new program in the dream world of wartime and crisis. During the depression and during the war, somehow we never had a basis for going at things in a systematic way. The legal basis for desired action never seemed to come in time, and we always seemed to be in a crisis before we could initiate a systematic approach. And I venture in a small voice to question whether these "normal" days

will ever recur, when we can start a field program the way we should like to.

No, the war agencies marched right into the lives of all the people, telling them what they could not do in a series of rapidly shifting programs. There were new and untried techniques; there were new and untried personnel. The groups at the center were fumbling for new policies, getting interagency clearances, getting approvals from control agencies in the executive branch and the Congress, mistrustful of new field men whom they seldom saw and to whom they had to entrust their beloved programs for mutilation. There were equally new field men who felt overloaded with an endless stream of mimeographed and multilithed instructions, some of which to them were obviously not geared to the problems that the field men were meeting in the community. There was an atmosphere, I think, in many of the agencies of mutual distrust, the field man in particular harboring resentment over reports not necessary to carry out his mission in the field. But when I have painted this picture of crisis government, the constantly, rapidly shifting programs of new untried ideas, I come away with the feeling that these emergency considerations simply highlight and accentuate elements in central-field relations that are always inherent in carrying out any administrative activity in widely spaced geographical areas and that the war experience probably brought out in bold relief factors that are present even in more placid times.

Problems of Districting

It would be possible to discuss central-field relationships from many aspects. We could spend an interesting session on the problem of territorial division and districting: what led to selecting the sizes of the areas, the boundaries of the areas that were determined for field operations. As regional head of the Office of the Administrator of the National Housing Agency, in charge of five Middle Atlantic States, in the last four and a half years I have had to deal with three regions of the War Manpower Commission, three War Production Board

regions, three branch offices of the Veterans Administration. The Office of Price Administration's region was coterminous with ours, but even within the fraternity of the National Housing Agency, only one constituent unit had the same regional pattern as the Office of the Administrator. I had to deal with three Federal Home Loan Banks, one of which had its headquarters in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, but covered Maryland. I had to reach out to Cleveland, Ohio, and Richmond, Virginia, to find my opposite numbers in other wartime agencies.

It is doubtless unavoidable that an organization dealing with urban problems should have different boundaries for its administrative areas throughout the nation than one that is dealing with rural problems; yet one is left with the feeling that there could have been a little more unity in these patterns, especially in the wartime agencies, so as to simplify the task before us, in order to get an equal working basis between the separate agencies.

Within our own five-state region, in a recent move to follow through with intensified compliance and enforcement of the controls on the use of building materials and the sales price of houses, I felt impelled to bring about a region-wide meeting of representatives of five Federal agencies. To see how the Veterans Emergency Housing Program was operating, to provide a vehicle for our people to talk to each other, we agreed to set up district coordinating committees of the field forces of these five agencies. We found that there were seven cities in the five states in which there was heavy concentration of field people, and without very much scientific thought we agreed that since Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Buffalo, and the others were cities with large staffs, we would use them as centers for our coordinating work. But there are other aspects of field relations that I would rather share with you, instead of extending this discussion of the interesting problem of drawing the boundaries of the administrative areas you set up.

Are Regional Offices Necessary?

I should like to advance the proposition that our war-time experience justifies as a principle of field relations the need for an office between the locality or the state and the central office in Washington, something like a regional office. You may smile; I am obviously looking at the world from my corner; I have been a Regional Director. I know we did things during the war under the compulsions of the crisis that other forces may tend to negative when we aren't in that sort of crisis. I know the difficulties in the maintenance of offices that don't conform to the lines of Congressional courtesies in the maintenance of personnel. Nevertheless, if we needed any more demonstration than was afforded by experience prior to the war, I believe that war experience made very clear that there is no effective way for Washington to deal with 48 states or with 3,000 counties, and that some intermediate level is needed.

Only a few weeks ago a young man from our Washington office, after several days in my office in New York, offered the neatest characterization of a regional office I have heard. He spoke of it as a "transformer station." I take it most of you here in Washington realize the validity of that figure of speech. I should like to return to it later.

The Tendency to Decentralize

Our wartime experience also warrants the statement of another principle of central-field administration, and that is, that there is a natural evolution of a new agency or a new program. You have at first fairly tight centralization while the departmental staff fumble for a new program; they have to hold it close to their chest, they have to work it through in Washington; they feel that they can't afford to let things get dissipated. But there comes a gradual devolution of responsibility to the field: first, as the program becomes more clearly defined; second, as the team gets more closely knit and there is more mutual trust and confidence that the field people aren't

going to ruin the beautiful dream; and, third, very realistically, as I have observed from the field, as new pressures at the center force attention to new aspects of the program, things that once seemed so vital are perforce left to the field. Washington hasn't the time to bother about them any more. So presently the field is allowed to act more freely on its own. I am certain that is not just a phenomenon of the group of agencies I have been working with. Indeed, there was a discussion here a few winters ago among the seconds-in-command of a dozen war agencies; chatting over this problem, they agreed pretty unanimously that each had observed in his agency this natural tendency to decentralize as time went on.

The World of Washington and the World of the Field

In offering a third proposition about central-field relations, I think of Herbert Emmerich's remark that Washington is the only place where the rest of the United States is called "the field." My third proposition deals with a psychological distinction that I have often noted and upon which I have commented to my Administrator and other high-ranking officials in Washington. Coming from my regional office not too far away, I am strikingly conscious of two different universes of discourse. The things that concern people in Washington, the day-to-day preoccupations, the things that make an emotional impact, the things that people worry about -- what are they? As I see them, coming in from the field, they are problems of relationship with the control agencies: the Budget Bureau, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the White House, the Comptroller General, the Congress. If you try to bring a field problem into the range of discourse, there is a little emotional resistance, you have to get people's eyes focused for the distant view, because they are continuously involved in these elements that make up their day-to-day preoccupation.

On the other hand, the universe of discourse of field men is apt to be operations, community adjustments, state and local relations. They are frequently spared

the painful problems created by the central controllers. If you have a good Washington team, they will take these problems off the necks of the field men, so that the field men can concentrate on their relations to the public and the other governmental groups out in the communities. Perhaps it may be said that the field is insensitive to the difficulties that the people in Washington have in getting clearances from the control agencies. Field men assume, perhaps too easily, that they will always be provided with what they need. But the field gets irritated in turn at Washington.

I recall the regional director of a Federal agency operating in my territory coming to me because he had received instructions from his chief in Washington to proceed to a certain state capitol to bring about a transfer of a certain function of the state government from one department to another so that this function would be in a unit under Federal supervision. While this regional friend of mine wept on my shoulder, I said, "That change will never be brought about in that state capitol because the group now active is close to the Governor, has his confidence, and is carrying the function on well. The change is a purely theoretical brain child of your Washington chief. There is no reason why the activity should be transferred." He was gratified to have it confirmed by someone who knew the state capitol that the suggestion from Washington was not well thought out. I offer that as a shining example of lack of understanding of local conditions.

I do not say that Washington is not aware of what goes on in the communities or is immune to pressures from the home town. The home town makes itself heard in Washington, as you well know. Delegations come in here and home-town people ask their Congressmen to communicate with Washington offices. Sometimes this impact of the community on the Washington staff results from bad field work. I have always believed that our job in the field is to give enough satisfaction to the customer at home so that he doesn't feel compelled to go to Washington in the hope of getting something he can't have merely because we haven't explained adequately to him locally why he is not going to get it. I do not claim that

you here in Washington don't get some direct impact of the customers' wants. My point is rather that the day-to-day concerns, the operating concerns of the folk here in Washington are so different that I can sometimes make my "departmental" friends blush a little by just pointing out that there is a field aspect of a problem which has been totally overlooked in drafting a document for action. They have so concentrated on relations here that they forgot for the moment that a program was being set up in the communities to be carried out by field people.

I should like to mention an incident that happened some months ago. Our Administrator came to New York and made a speech before a group of fairly distinguished New Yorkers (it is a little hard in New York to say that any group of 50 or 100 are the most important people in town). It was a well-publicized talk, and the occasion was well covered by the reporters. The burden of the Administrator's talk was that we were going to see to it that these new regulations controlling the use of materials were observed; that we were out to get the black marketeers. I had previously received instructions to carry that message to every community, to use our own field staff to hold local meetings with the people concerned, the veterans, the builders, the city officials, to bring it home to them, too, that under these new procedures requiring the set-aside of scarce materials, we were going to see to it they were really set aside and that the rules were enforced. The day the Administrator talked in New York, our field man for Long Island conducted a meeting in a hall not four miles from the auditorium in which the National Administrator was speaking. Wilson Wyatt talked in the Woolworth Building and Dan McAvoy talked in Lost Battalion Hall, Queens. The Long Island newspapers printed McAvoy's speech and did not print Wyatt's. It was news in Jamaica, news in Hempstead, that our local man in Queens said the black market was going to be broken; it was not news that the National Administrator said the same thing a few miles away in the center of the metropolis.

I shared an interesting afternoon this spring with our Administrator in Buffalo. He asked that we arrange a little tour for him--just one car, with only four or five

associates. He wanted to go out and see some houses under construction. We drove him around with the local representative of the Federal Housing Administration, who, of course, knew the builders. We would stop and get out of the car; the Federal Housing Administration man would find the builder or his foreman and introduce us. Mr. Wyatt would talk with him: "How are things going? What are your troubles? What are your shortages?" When we got back to the hotel, I said to the Administrator, "Did you notice that with all the headlines and movie news-reels about the Wyatt program, those men didn't recognize you?" They knew the local FHA man; they were willing to be polite to the man he brought around. Mr. Wyatt said with a smile that he had gotten used to that as Mayor of Louisville.

The Field Man is the Front-Line Man

That episode leads me to my next proposition, which is that in an action program it is helpful to recognize that the field man is the front-line man and that in one sense all the rest of us back of him are the service of supply. The agency will be made or broken by the impression the field man makes in his community. I had an interesting conversation with a political leader in an important state in my region, who said of one of the large wartime agencies, "Why do you think they got into so much trouble with the public? Because they had the kind of man behind the counter who said, when a citizen came in to ask for something: 'I don't think it should be like this; it is those crackpots down in Washington who make these crazy regulations.'" He said, "How can you win, when people in the field aren't with you?" Of course, he had a different moral to draw than I have here.

The point I make is, you will have a much sounder understanding of field relations if you remember that the man out there on the firing line is going to make or break your agency. I deprecate especially a distinction that I so often hear circulating around: the big jobs are in Washington; we in Washington make the policy; it is the duty of the field to execute it. Policy is made every

time a clerk behind the counter deals with a citizen. You can sometimes delude yourselves that you are making policy by sending out a memorandum, but my view of it is that you can do very little at this end unless your people in the field are ready to help you make that policy stick.

Communication as the Central Problem of Washington-Field Relations

That statement leads me to the point that before the war, during the war, and after the war, the central problem of Washington-field relations is communication: how to make the local man act as part of the national agency; how to get central policy understood; how to permit appropriate variations to local needs; and how to bring it about that field experience has some impact in the formulation of policy. Now, just as we could very well have an evening together on the selection of districts, we could have a number of evenings on the problem of communication.

What are the devices for communication? First, obviously, orders, directives, interpretations. I am sure you have as modest an opinion as I have of their effectiveness as tools of administration. What can we do to make them more effective? I offer this suggestion, which is something we have used in our regional office for four and a half years. I have made it a matter of principle never to send to our local field men a legalistic page from the Federal Register or a formal instruction of the kind we receive from Washington without adding an interpretive one-page mimeographed cover sheet that explains in simple terms what the document is about: "This is done to get around a certain obstacle in our program; and if this is followed, it is expected such and such effects will ensue." It is at least probable that the field men will read that cover page if they find that what I tell them is of acute concern to them at the moment. If it isn't, they file it under a designated subject-heading, so that when the problem becomes acute, they can quickly pull all the relevant items out of the file and run through them.

Some of the war agencies used house organs to supplement orders, directives, and interpretations. When Lawrence Appley was Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission, he devised a document called "What's Cooking?" That was an attempt to put before people in the field things that hadn't yet happened, to let them have a look at proposals that were being formulated, before they became final. Appley let me have a copy; there was a box on the cover which said: "If you have any suggestions before this goes into effect, let us have them by telegraph or telephone." Appley was certain that that was one document the regional directors read the day they received it.

In our housing-expediting work we have made considerable use of the conference telephone call. I confess that I did not know until recently that this technique had been advanced beyond a point which permitted a man in Washington to speak simultaneously to a number of field directors in different cities. It is now possible for the field directors to talk freely with Washington and each other. In a number of instances, Washington has put out a tentative proposal to the eight of us regional directors and we have had a friendly telephone discussion back and forth between Seattle, Boston, San Francisco, Dallas, and the other regional headquarters. After such a discussion Washington has sometimes said, "We can see now that this isn't going to work so well as we thought and we had better try another way."

Bringing field people to Washington, visits of Washington people to the field, interchange of assignments, are all familiar to you. There was less use of these devices during the war than there ought to be after the war because of pressure of time and difficulties in travel.

I hold a strong brief for the staff meeting as an enormously important tool for communication and for stimulating the two-way flow of carrying directives out to the field people and giving the field people a chance to feel that their contribution is carried back. This brings me back to the phrase, "transformer station" as descriptive of the regional office. When I say that our regional office always attaches a cover sheet before a directive from Washington goes out to the local field men, you may

well ask, "Why doesn't your central office do that?" In an ideal world, I grant, a new order wouldn't be initiated until such preparatory work had been done. Short of such an ideal world, there is need for the "transformer" to step down or convert these ideas from the center into terms that are more immediately and directly meaningful to the particular group of people working in that part of the United States, to communities of the character we have in our part of the country, in that climate, where that kind of occupation goes on.

The Division of Field Operations

I should like to raise one more question about what we have learned in central-field relations during the war, when we have had more programs involving controls than we had before the war. That is the use of an office or division of field operations as a device to channel communications between the center and the field. It seems to me that nearly every one of the war agencies used the device, experimented with it at one time or another, found advantages in it, but also found disadvantages in it. It is exceedingly difficult to avoid one of two extremes in having a division of field operations through which everything gets channeled to the field from the center: Either you tend to have correspondence clerks or you have Richelieus. Either their function is to be a messenger boy or they begin to tell you what policy should be, without finding out from the right technical branch what that technical branch thinks ought to be done. I am not talking particularly about the agency in which I happen to work; I have seen the same forces operating elsewhere. Whether or not we have surmounted them is a question again. Those are the polarities, the opposite extremes between which you have somehow to go.

A division of field operations is exceedingly hard to staff. What the late Chief Justice Stone said about the only controlling force that kept the Supreme Court in bounds can be said about the men in field operations: It is their self-restraint alone which enables them to function. To say a good word for a division of field operations,

I value the aid they give me by minimizing the number of requests that would otherwise come streaming out from various substantive branches in Washington, requests for round-ups of information, more detailed instructions, specific requests to do certain things. I am sure that in our own agency probably not one-third of those communications proposed reaches the field because the division of field operations exercises judgment as to the capacity of the field to handle these things, and they say to the central staff man, "I know it is important, but eight things have gone out today, and there isn't any possibility of the ninth being taken care of."

I have observed, on the other hand, that the very process which is important to us in the field can be frustrating to the people at the center. They think up programs; they want to find out how they are going; they want to make sure they are going well; and to find a division of field operations cutting them off from the freedom of access to the field makes them terribly frustrated. My suggestion to minimize that unhappy situation is to encourage great freedom of interchange of ideas between the functional specialists in Washington and in the field, quite outside of lines of command and lines of supervision; in that way the division of field operations can channel the command lines and still permit labor specialists in the field to exchange ideas with your labor specialists at the center.

I do not know whether the war crisis made this worse or not, but one of the perennial problems of central-field relations was brought out to me just a week or two ago when I happened to be in Chicago and chatted with our Chicago regional man. He said that he had kept count for two weeks and that in that time 32 men from our Washington office had been through his region. Chicago, of course, gets the brunt of it: the train from the East comes in there in the morning and as a rule the train to the West does not leave until that afternoon, so, of course, the traveler runs up to the regional office while there. I note the tendency on the part of my Washington friends to come to New York toward the end of the week; our office, fortunately, is not too far away from Altman's, Gimbel's, Saks', McCreery's, and Macy's. We welcome

our friends, but I offer as a question mark in central-field relations the extent and nature of this sort of travel.

I end with the note that what we have learned from the war with respect to central-field relations is an accentuation of what we might have known before, that these relations will be managed well when there is mutual self-restraint and when there is a vivid sense of interrelationships pervading the organization.

Questions

Question: Do you feel that the tendency generally is to go too far or not far enough in writing out instructions from the central office to the region?

Mr. Ascher: I believe that, on the whole, there is too much of an attempt to spell things out precisely; it is fruitless and just frustrates people in the field when they know that in their community they can't in fact apply this rather detailed specification; and the net result is, they don't pay much attention to it. They know they have got to solve the problem somehow in their own terms. The overspecification has wasted your time here in Washington because it can't be effective.

Question: I know of an agency that does not issue a policy instruction or procedure to the field without having a mixed Washington-field panel work it out and submit it to the field, and get opinions on it before it is issued finally.

Mr. Ascher: That is an excellent idea. If that was not done enough during the war, it was probably the result of pressure of time. I was happy within the last few weeks, when a rather important document had to be drafted on proposed changes in our policy to accommodate to certain decontrols, that it was thought worth while to ask three of us to fly in from regional centers to take part in the shaping of it.

Question: With agencies that have fairly large concentrations of field staff, a problem that always arises

is whether the central office should prescribe standard organization for all regions. What is your opinion?

Mr. Ascher: I would warn against that. I recall the testimony of one of the Commissioners of the Federal Public Housing Authority who set up a scheme of organization at the center and insisted that the regional directors of his twelve offices follow that pattern. He told me after a year or two he was sorry he had done it; all he needed was to make sure that each regional director had three specified assistants corresponding to his own three assistants, but below that he thought it would have been much better for them to shape their own needs. I noted recently that the pattern of field organization in our regional office in Chicago was entirely different from mine in New York.

I am against organization charts. A chart is either a picture of something that is supposed to happen or something that once happened. It is an expression of a hope that we will find a certain constellation of people, or else it is a record of the group of people we once found. You never will find the same combination of traits and skill twice or continuing over a stretch of time. I am conscious of that every time that we regional directors are brought into Washington and I watch the Administrator explain what he wants to have done. I know the men well enough to know that in the nature of things what the Administrator wishes will be carried out differently in each of the eight regions. He may get his objectives equally well achieved in all eight places, because they are good people; but I don't think he is going to help any by trying to tell all eight of them, "This is the way to do it," because it just won't happen that way. They are different human beings.

Question: How would you describe the function of your own position as head of a regional office in relation to the technical specialists in Washington?

Mr. Ascher: There is always a great deal of discussion of that question. For instance, the Social Security Administration has three rather different programs operating in the field, and the debate there has always been whether the regional director is to have authority over

the three types of field men who administer these programs. I have seen the same thing in the New York City Health Department, which has 15 district health centers. Shall the director of each health center tell the tuberculosis specialists in that center what to do, or shall the head of the central tuberculosis bureau tell them? The director of the center must have enough administrative authority so that when a family comes into the health center for treatment, he can schedule the activities so that when the mother is being checked for one thing, the child can be checked for tuberculosis, and so on. If the Social Security Administration's solution works for them, it can only be because the three elements of their program work together. I think it perfectly possible to have no friction and yet give the regional operating head enough administrative responsibility to make the team work together. May I refer you to a chapter in a book published some years ago which ought to be more widely known. It is in a study by Arthur MacMahon on The Administration of Federal Work Relief. It is Chapter 11, and it is called "The Rival Claims of Hierarchy and Specialty." MacMahon advances the thesis that every person in public administration is always subject to dual supervision, and the failure to recognize that creates artificialities which result in difficulties.

Question: Is there any relationship between the effective achievement of maximum decentralization and fairly standard organization in the field? If we achieve the ultimate in decentralization, wouldn't it perhaps follow that a fairly substantial measure of uniformity would be desirable?

Mr. Ascher: I think you confuse the end objective. If the purpose of the Employment Service is to conduct interviews, then you might prescribe very precisely how to have interviews; but the purpose of the Employment Service is to put people in jobs. To make sure that people are put in jobs, or whatever the end objective of the program is, the central office must have other ways of communicating or effecting control besides precise prescription.

Question: You were speaking of dual supervision a minute ago. If you bring the field operations division into the picture, isn't that triple supervision, in a way?

Mr. Ascher: It isn't if the division of field operations gets itself into the frame of mind that it is serving the field. I would not be prepared to say that the division of field operations supervises the field. It is the channel, it is the vehicle for orderly communication, and in reverse it serves the field in Washington. The field man may not know which one of five people to ask a certain question and he lets the division of field operations find the answer--there may be two or three people involved--let them work it out.

We have never been able to issue an organization chart that showed central-field relationships, because it is a three-dimensional relationship. You will never be able to show it on a piece of paper. If you start reaching out into the field you have a third dimension, and you can't show that on a flat piece of paper.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

by
Estes Kefauver
Member of Congress

I am going to approach this subject partly from the viewpoint of relationships between Congress and the executive agencies during the war, but even more from the standpoint of some of the things which should be done to make sure that we have closer cooperation in the years to come.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

From that viewpoint, I think it is important to consider very briefly just what Congress did in the Reorganization Act of 1946. The general public seems to have the impression that Congress has completely reorganized itself, that now we have a modern, twentieth-century, streamlined Congress. It is unfortunate that that impression prevails, because there was a great movement and a great pressure from the public and the press to do something about our antiquated system. As a matter of fact, while Congress did make some very splendid improvements, I would say that the job actually is only about 15 percent done.

The first thing that we did in the Reorganization Act was to greatly reduce, merge, and consolidate the committees. In the House I think we had 48. We cut them down to 18. The Senate committees are cut down from 33 to 15. The question of whether they will remain that way or whether we will again start the procession of adding new committees will depend on the Houses of Congress each year as they adopt their new rules.

It is also greatly to the credit of Congress that we decided to have staffs for our various committees. Unfor-

unately, however, the method of selecting the staff members on a nonpartisan, merit basis was stricken from the bill, so that they are still under the old patronage system and a great deal of the possible effectiveness of the change has been lost. Also, the strengthening of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, making it an independent agency and enlarging it for the benefit of the Members of Congress, was a fine step in the right direction. The Legislative Counsel were given an additional amount and their activities were enlarged. Then, of course, most all of us Members of Congress really felt that the idea of increasing our pay and enabling us to join the retirement plan was a step in the right direction. But insofar as the matter of the relationship between Congress and the Executive, nothing has been done. On the House side, nothing has been done to see that the majority and the minority parties formulate their own programs. The Senate did make a separate provision for a steering committee, which I think will very well answer the needs of the majority on the Senate side.

During the war, in an attempt to have smooth working relations between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, we adopted many makeshift provisions. I think the necessity for cooperation was one of the principal reasons for the appointment of Members of Congress as Cabinet members. You in the Agriculture Department had liaison with Congress during the latter part of the war not only through your committee appearances and through contact with Members of Congress, but through your very excellent Secretary, Mr. Clinton P. Anderson, who was a Member of the House at the time of his appointment; and the same is true of other departments and agencies in which Members of Congress were given the key positions.

Unfortunately, the provision in the reorganization bill to set up a legislative-executive liaison or policy committee was stricken out as a condition of consideration of the bill in the House, so in that field nothing has been done. It is most unfortunate that it wasn't. As a matter of fact, we are now entering a very interesting and, I am afraid it may be, a difficult period, with a Republican

Congress and a Democratic Executive. Both sides have said that they want to cooperate. The President has said he would meet good will with good will, and, of course, the Republican House and Senate leaders said that they were willing to cooperate; but beyond those prefacial approaches, so far as I know nothing has been done. As a matter of fact, the Republicans have gone on and are going on formulating their program without consultation or meeting with any Democratic leaders or the President; and the President has made his offer of cooperation but hasn't, so far as I know, followed it up with any active effort to meet with and contact the Republican leaders.

The Need for Closer Collaboration

So what I am going to say about what we may expect from the next Congress is not very cheering. I am afraid the expression of good will and the honeymoon will last two or three weeks and then it will be a battle royal, and just what will take place no one knows. I feel certain, however, that insofar as any progressive, forward-looking legislation in the field of education, health, and so forth is concerned not very much is going to be done in the next two years.

The need for closer collaboration between the Congress and the Administration has frequently been felt and voiced. So long as the United States was half empty, prosperous, and well protected by broad oceans, the old idea of balance of power maintained by dividing government into watertight compartments was tolerable. Now that our nation is crowded, harrassed by weighty social and economic problems, and deeply involved in world affairs, better teamwork between the legislative and executive segments of government is essential to our welfare and national security.

Many remedies have been suggested to cure this potentially dangerous gap in the operation of our government. Some would scrap the check-and-balance system entirely and substitute the British parliamentary system. Others would make constitutional changes to create a

hybrid of the two. In line with that idea is the recent suggestion of Senator Fulbright, that when the people completely repudiate the Congress that is in office, that automatically means they have repudiated the President and should therefore have a new President of the same faith as the new Congress. The Constitution does make it easy for the executive and legislative branches to cherish their formal separation, if they are so disposed. Equally certain is it that the founding fathers never intended the Republic should be without effective government. President Franklin Roosevelt summarized the situation when he said: "The letter of the Constitution wisely declared a separation but the impulse of common purpose declares a union."

Nothing in the Constitution prevents practical procedures being devised to enable the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to work together in the formulation of legislation, instead of acting too often like antagonists in a struggle for power. Several such methods have been proposed. They range from a joint advisory group composed of Cabinet and Congressional leaders meeting weekly to mixed commissions like the Temporary National Economic Committee, on which sat representatives of both Congress and the Administration. The Chief advocate of legislative policy committees is Thomas K. Finletter. His proposal is a very worth-while one and is most gravely needed. In his book entitled *Can Representative Government do the Job?* Mr. Finletter points out that throughout the history of our nation, except during times of crises or immediately following the repudiation of an administration, we have never for any length of time had a cordial, reasoning relationship between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

Lack of Information, and its Consequences

Most of the disputes between the executive and legislative branches arise from a lack of facts on particular issues. An administrative chief may get an excellent idea or discover that a simple bill will solve a difficult problem. But sometimes he decides it is useless to try

to get it through Congress because he fears "those so-and-so's on the Hill never will study the facts."

More often a legislator gets fragmentary information from a constituent, reads a few paragraphs in a newspaper, or hears a part of a broadcast, then forthwith and with all the comfortable immunity from libel that his remarks in the Senate or House enjoy, belabors some hapless official or fires oral broadsides at an entire department. Occasionally this blind shooting hits a vulnerable target. At other times, Congress has been made to look petty and ridiculous and deserving the scorn of its bitterest critics. In clear disregard of constitutional rights that any village lawyer would have recognized, the Congress some time ago cut off the salaries of three officials: Morris Lovett, of the Interior Department, and Goodwin Watson and William E. Dodd, Jr., of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Division of the Federal Communications Commission, because they were suspected of holding views classed as "un-American." The Court of Claims promptly rebuked the legislative branch when the officials, who had had no trial and no chance to defend themselves, took their case to the bar for redress and were sustained. Their salaries have since been paid.

Members constantly are tempted to fire with buckshot because no better ammunition is available. The endless succession of requests for investigations of this and that betrays the fundamental lack of information that plagues our Senators and Congressmen. In the 78th Congress there were 217 resolutions seeking various kinds of inquiries filed in the two Houses. There were 37 requests for special investigating committees making inquiries.

Much information now available to Congress is not in a form that can be used easily. We are supposed to keep up with what the executive agencies are doing by reading their annual reports. They are voluminous and those who compile them tell Congress and the people, to a considerable extent, what they want us to know. But with the pressure of work already imposing a physical strain on many legislators, very few have time to read these reports. Furthermore, they do not keep us currently informed. Annual departmental reports are post mortems and therefore of little more than historical interest. Few

would argue that these volumes suffice to do a real information job, although they are useful as reference material.

Then there are printed committee hearings. It is humanly impossible for any member to read all of these. They are more extensive than the departmental annual reports. Hearings on appropriation bills have run to more than 2,000 pages. Thousand-page volumes are not uncommon. They contain many tables and page after page of fine print. At the other extreme, hearings on a bill that is not favorably reported may never be printed.

Even under the new committee organization of Congress, particularly in the Senate, a member will have difficulty attending all the meetings of committees to which he is assigned. And often a member is intensely interested in a measure that is before some group other than his own. Even if he used roller skates, he could not possibly attend more than three hearings in any one morning. And any morning may find ten to twelve committees in session in each body.

A daily digest of committee action and hearings prepared by expert staff members and inserted in the *Congressional Record* would be of great advantage to the members. There is a provision in the Reorganization Act whereby a digest of proceedings of the House on the day before is put into the *Congressional Record* but there is no provision for a digest of committee action. But committees usually are considering a specific bill. Congress needs data on the departments, on the administration of the laws to determine whether the intent of the legislation is being followed, and, to an ever-increasing degree, Congress needs to be kept abreast of developments in foreign affairs. It sums up to a crucial need of supplementing committee procedure, some way of giving Members a better picture of the big overall issue confronting the nation. This would tend to make Congress more nationally and internationally minded.

The present committee system also works a great hardship on administrators. Several groups frequently are inquiring into the same matter and each calls the head of a department before it. This official gives substantially the same testimony over and over again. When

the busy William Jeffers was working 16 hours a day trying to solve the rubber shortage, he was called before five committees during a single week. Paul McNutt and Donald Nelson, then heading the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board, respectively, duplicated their statements before several House groups in one week. Donald Nelson once said that in one month he thought that he had appeared before every House committee. I remember that when we had the matter of contract termination legislation in the House we had it before six committees. Several committees had an interest in the problem of disposing of surplus property and war plants, and now the question of atomic energy is another matter that transcends the jurisdiction of any single committee.

Even under the new simplified committee set-up, the need remains for something more than a tiny percentage of the entire membership of the Senate and House getting a proper briefing on important issues. This need was felt acutely by the Army during the war. So a make-shift plan of addressing the Congress was devised. The Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, the then Under-Secretary, Robert Patterson, and General George Marshall, Chief of Staff, held informal meetings with Congressional groups. Some of these sessions lasted three hours. When he succeeded General Marshall in the top Army job, General Dwight D. Eisenhower found Congress highly critical of demobilization and he resorted to the same strategy. A Baltimore Sun editorial printed on January 30, 1946, dramatized the situation in some pointed, satiric observations. It said:

On Tuesday, General Eisenhower appeared before a large audience in the Library of Congress and made a speech. It was a good speech and on a gravely important and urgent subject. In a word, the General, as Chief of Staff, was telling Americans that if they want to keep conquered nations down, as all Americans do, they will have to have an army to do it with.

What audience did the General choose to hear this speech? Oh, a Washington audience, mostly men in the middle or later years, bright men by

their looks, fairly well off, intelligently interested in the subject matter. Any other thing to remark about the audience? Well, they did happen to be Members of Congress of the United States.

But, if this was the Congress of the United States listening to a discussion of high state policy by the Chief of Staff on a question of supreme national import, why did it all take place in the Library of Congress? Why was the meeting procedurally and technically informal? Why were there no questions from the floor? Why was this historic gathering of the military and the civilian legislative authority so carefully disguised as just such a public lecture as might have taken place at the grange hall in any rural village of the Republic? . . .

But by and large, the fact that General Eisenhower, like Messrs. Stimson and Patterson before him, had to take this extraordinary and informal way of laying his case before the National Legislature argues a certain defect in our constitutional practice . . .

A Proposal for a Report and Question Period

The Sun's satire is deserved. The executive branch of the government was running the show. Members of Congress were there to listen. There was no opportunity for questions or to direct the course of the discussion. It was after one of these lectures that I decided to file a House Resolution for a report and question period. Senator William J. Fulbright proposed a similar measure in the Senate. I am going to talk in some detail about this resolution, because I think it would do more than anything I know of to create better relations between the executive and legislative departments.

The objective of this proposal is to provide an orderly and useful method of permitting Cabinet members and heads of agencies to meet Congress face to face on the floor of the Senate and House and talk things over. This report and question period, as our proposal is called, involves merely a change in the rules governing floor

procedure in the Senate and House. No constitutional amendment is involved. The Constitution says (Article I, section 5, paragraph 2): "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . ."

The House Resolution provided that no more than two hours shall be set aside at least every two weeks but not more than once a week to question administrative officials from the floor. This time can be found without upsetting the schedules of the two bodies by eliminating much relatively unimportant work Congress still imposes on itself.

During the first hour, the official would answer questions previously submitted in writing, approved by the committee having jurisdiction over his agency, and printed in the Congressional Record. The last hour, divided equally between the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee issuing the invitation, would be given over to oral questions from the Members.

These questions would have to be germane to the preceding discussion and the Speaker would disallow, and the official would not have to reply to, an improper question. These are safeguards against heckling. Also, in time of war, some impromptu questions would have to be ruled out for reasons of national security. Under present organization, the Rules Committee would fix the length of time for each period, which in any case would not exceed two hours. It also would fix the priority of appearances in the event that more than one invitation was pending at any one time.

The plan is as simple as that. No complicated parliamentary changes are necessary to put this constructive step into operation--only a simple amendment to the House rules. And the same holds true for the Senate.

The idea of a question and report period has been before the public long enough to appraise the nature of the opposition to it. I wish to point out some things it is not before outlining its positive advantages. It does not infringe on the spirit of the Constitution. It is not going to upset the balance of power between the divisions of our government. It does not contemplate substituting now or in the future the British or any parliamentary system of government for our own. It seeks neither to

aggrandize nor impair the executive power. Congress would not be given any undue or unconstitutional authority over Cabinet members and agency chiefs. These are selected by the President and their service can be discontinued by him. The legal relations between the President and Congress are in no wise altered. And the question and report period is not conceived with any idea of partisan advantage to either the majority or the minority. But we do believe its operation will help shorten what often grows to be a long, long mile between the Capitol and the White House.

The plan seeks only to confer upon the executive officers a privilege and a duty to explain the operation of their respective departments and bureaus, present their problems, and furnish information that will enable Congress to legislate more intelligently and investigate with more light and less heat.

From the legislator's viewpoint, there would be a great gain in knowledge and background acquired in a manner far more economical of time and energy than any present method available to the members, such as plodding through a thousand-page committee hearing. A committee could lighten its work if it had this means of informing the entire membership of the organization and problems of the department it is supervising. It would provide a way of keeping currently advised of the manner in which the executive agencies are administering the laws we pass. It would give these officials a chance to discuss their personnel, how they deal with the public (which, on Capitol Hill, means constituents), and to tell us what difficulties they encounter. The closest approach now to any member getting this information is the specialized knowledge acquired by and from five to seven persons sitting behind closed doors on an appropriations subcommittee and going over a departmental budget bill. And they only hear the hopes and woes of a single department or group of agencies.

One of the most important results of the operation of a report and question period would be to establish the importance of Congress in the public mind. At present, administrators hold news conferences. Radio and press reporters are assigned regularly to the more important

departments. These news conferences are given more prominence in the newspapers and over the radio than action taken by Congress on important measures. If the plans and proposals for the administration of laws are brought out on the floor of the House and Senate, pursuant to questions from members, the important news would arise from what was said on these occasions rather than from what was said at some news conference "down-town."

Present methods may be satisfactory to the "oldsters" in Congress--those with 20 or 30 years of service. But we must consider the needs of the average member. In the House, the average tenure is a fraction over two terms. Thus, over the course of the years, the votes cast by the House are by men who have been in office slightly over two terms. The question and report period, handled in the spirit in which it is proposed, would be vastly useful in keeping all Members of Congress posted as to the policies of the executive divisions and the workings of the various bureaus. All these units were established by Congress and spend billions of dollars which we authorize. It is our duty to know what they are doing.

Advantages to the executive branch of the government are hardly less impressive. In making appointments, the President would have to keep in mind that his aides are going to be called upon to appear on the floor of the Senate and House. His administration would be judged to a considerable extent by the impressions of these administrators. It would be a compelling incentive to secure outstanding men for the key executive positions. The administrators would gain in insight into the views of the people as expressed through the questions of their elected representatives. And these department heads and bureau chiefs would consider more deliberately their decisions and executive orders if they knew they might be called upon to render an official accounting. There could be no ghost writing. These men would have to know their departments and be able to give the facts. The proposed system would be comparable to banking examinations. The banks keep their books in order all the time because they never know when the examiner will be around. Congress might not call a given agency chief before it for

several years but he never could be certain of that and would conduct his administration so as to be prepared when his time came.

Rumors or unjust criticism often spread about executive officers or their practices. If it comes from a Member of Congress, the executive involved generally has no opportunity to answer except through the radio and press. This further irritates the Congressman who made the original charge. The question and report period would give the executive an opportunity to explain his side of a controversy where it would do him the most good and where he still would be given adequate news coverage.

In the complex society we have today it is necessary to concentrate much power in the executive and allow wide discretion in the execution of general laws. This condition will continue and probably increase regardless of the party in power. Appearances before Congress would require Cabinet members and administrative chiefs to formulate clear definitions of executive policies. Sometimes these officials do not know what the President's policy is on certain matters under their jurisdiction. This is no reflection on the present executive establishment. The same condition always has existed. Before an administrator appeared at a question period, he naturally would call upon the Chief Executive to define clearly his policy in regard to matters on which the official was to be questioned. And at a lower level, the administrator himself would have to make up his mind on many questions he now may dodge. Faced with an invitation to make a personal report to Congress, he would be taking a great risk if he did not settle those undetermined factors affecting his department before submitting to interrogation. Would it not have been a great help if Secretary Byrnes had had the opportunity of explaining to the entire Senate or House, or both, his thinking and plans on our foreign policy? And the same holds true for Mr. Wilson Wyatt after he had formulated his program to deal with the housing crisis. Much fog could have been dispelled if the proper Treasury and State Department officials could have appeared at a report period to answer questions regarding the postwar loan to Britain.

The Proposal is Not New

This proposal may sound very precedent-shattering, unorthodox, or even radical. Actually it is as old as Congress itself. Many of the men who framed the Constitution were also members of the First Congress. When the law organizing the Treasury Department was passed in 1789, it was made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to "make reports and give information to either branch of the legislature, in person or in writing, as he may be required, respecting all matters which may be referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives or which shall appertain to his office." Objection was made in debate that this might lead to having all the Cabinet secretaries on the floor. Nevertheless, it passed. The record also shows that on July 22, 1789, "The Secretary of Foreign Affairs attended, agreeably to order, and made the necessary explanations." The next month, the Annals of Congress show that "The President of the United States came into the Senate Chamber, attended by General Knox (Secretary of War), and laid before the Senate the following statement of facts with the questions hereto annexed, for their advice and consent."

Historians say that Washington did not like the treatment he got before the Senate. The record shows that in the First Congress, Washington appeared before the Senate to discuss a treaty with the Creek Indians. He was kept waiting two days, and he said he would never come back. However, the appearance of his Cabinet members and the message sent up in 1790 advising the Senate that the Secretary of War would "attend them" to discuss this treaty shows that the Father of our Country who presided over the Constitutional Convention used and thought well of the personal report system in his administration. There are about 14 references to a member of the executive branch appearing before the Senate during the First Congress. And the Congressional Globe cites eight similar instances in the House. Unfortunately, the records are not clear as to what took place, and it is fair to say that probably the Cabinet members acted largely as couriers. So this is not an un-American proposal, but a very healthy one which I think would be of much value to

both the departments of the government and to the legislative branch.

President Jefferson discontinued the practice of addressing Congress in person. When Woodrow Wilson revived it more than a century later, there was considerable criticism on the ground that such appearances were not in keeping with our tradition. The record is against the critics. It was a policy open to the President under the Constitution. In the same manner, the proposal we are making is open to us because of the wisdom of the men who wrote our basic law.

A bill to permit heads of executive departments to occupy seats on the floor of the House was reported unanimously in 1864 by a select committee headed by a Representative George Pendleton of Ohio. The war emergency caused it to be shunted aside, but Pendleton revived it in 1881, when he was a Senator. He headed another committee which included Senator James G. Blaine, twice Secretary of State and later a Republican Presidential candidate, Senator W. B. Allison, who served 35 years in that body, and other distinguished members. Again, there was a unanimous report for adoption. The movement failed, apparently because it made attendance of the administrators compulsory and some felt this would interfere with the work of Congress. Others said Congress would be exalted over the executive, and vice versa. Committees were apprehensive that they would be supplanted. The question and report period I have proposed avoids all of these objections.

The Pendleton resolution failed in the House because a member made a dramatic speech about "aping England." Feeling against Britain at that time was running high because of her open aid to the Confederacy and the argument was effective. Actually it is an American device, planned to operate entirely within the present American constitutional framework. However, if this can be called remotely an English idea, it is well to remember that English common law, the Bill of Rights, and habeas corpus also were great British institutions which we adopted and which have meant much to the American people.

There is abundant contemporary support for the plan.

President Taft in his annual message in 1912 said, "... I do not think that I am mistaken in saying that the presence of Members of the Cabinet on the floor of each House would greatly contribute to the enactment of legislation." Similar views were expressed by President Garfield, President Wilson, President Hoover, Chief Justice Hughes, Elihu Root, John W. Davis, Nicholas Murray Butler, Charles A. Beard, and a host of others.

I have consulted many thoughtful members of both parties, who endorse the proposal. It has wide popular support. A Gallup poll in 1944 showed that seven out of every ten persons interviewed favored the proposition set out in the House Resolution filed by me. Only seven out of every hundred were against it. More than 300 newspapers and publications, Democratic, Republican, and independent, including such esteemed journals as the New York Times, the St. Louis Dispatch, the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Star, the Washington Post, and the Raleigh News and Observer have urged its adoption in some form.

At one time President Roosevelt polled his Cabinet members, and all but one were unqualifiedly for it, and that one felt that it would be all right if certain changes were made. But, of course, we have been stymied about getting action on it by the Rules Committee of the House, where many things are frequently stymied. Also, Speakers of the House are not usually very much in favor of any changes that might take away any of their power or prerogatives. They are always willing to let things stand as they are. But with the situation we now have of a Democratic President and a Republican Congress, I think it is all the more important that some method be found, such as this, which will enable the Democratic Cabinet member to have an opportunity of explaining his plans and proposals, and his side of the controversy, not to just a few Members on a subcommittee but to the whole Congress, in order that the weight of public opinion may come to bear either to put through his proposal or to change it or kill it, whatever the result may be. This is not new in our history.

We are entering the most important and challenging period of our own and of world history. Our form of

government, which has endured such great crises as the War Between the States, may be facing even more crucial tests. No item on the present agenda of democracy has a higher priority than that of inducing closer, stronger, steadier cooperation between the President and the Congress. I believe that the report and question proposal is a healthy step in this direction.

Questions

Question: Are you familiar with the Confederate Constitution, which provided that the members of the Cabinet should have seats in the Senate and the House?

Representative Kefauver: Yes, Alexander Stephens of Georgia, who was a great statesman and had served in the United States Senate, felt that lack of this was one of the weaknesses of the Federal Constitution; so in writing the legislative section of the Confederate Constitution it was upon his insistence, and by unanimous vote, incidentally, that a provision was placed in it giving department heads seats in the legislature. After providing, as in the Federal Constitution, that no member of the executive department could hold an office in the Congress, it goes on to say: "But Congress may, by law, grant to the principal officer in each of the executive departments a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department." Unfortunately, under Jefferson Davis the Congress never had a chance to implement that provision, so they never had any actual experience with it.

Question: Would the question and answer period be confined pretty much to a report on things that had been done, or would it extend to the point where members of the two Houses might ask representatives of the executive branch their opinions about problems which were up for determination in the way of legislation or otherwise?

Representative Kefauver: I might answer your question in this way. I have in mind that as soon as possible after the election of a new Congress the Secretary of

Agriculture, for example, would be invited to come up and tell about his plans for his Department, about the problems he has been having and what he hopes to do about them. I want Members of Congress to have an opportunity to see him and get an over-all picture of what the Department is doing and the program he has in mind. I would do the same with the other departments. In the field of foreign affairs I think it would be most useful if we should have a joint session every so often and have the Secretary up to keep us up to date on what the shooting is about on foreign affairs. Then when there is some big legislative problem such as contract termination, surplus property, or atomic energy, I would get the man up there who knows most about it and let him discuss it with everybody. I don't think a great deal is gained by having officials come up for the purpose of trying to find out whether they have done something wrong.

Question: Under present practices, when a department wants to send up a proposed piece of legislation, it is cleared with the Budget Bureau where, among other things, it is reviewed to determine whether or not it is in line with the Administration's program. Would this interfere in any way with the operation of the plan you have proposed?

Representative Kefauver: Before Cabinet members make statements before Congressional committees they can usually get clearance on what they are going to say, and they are usually very free and informative. They could do very much the same thing before the Houses. The advantage would be that they could talk about major problems and programs before some Congressman gets to talking about a manufacturing plant or Army post in his particular district or some pet grievance he has, which detracts from the broad interest of what the official is saying. I don't think that the requirement of clearance of statements with the Bureau of the Budget would interfere. As a matter of fact, I talked over this matter with Harold Smith while he was Director of the Budget, and he didn't have any objection to it on that basis.

Question: Would these be joint sessions?

Representative Kefauver: No, sir, not the way the present resolution is written.

Question: Did the Committee on Rules point out any specific objections to your proposal?

Representative Kefauver: The committee never made any specific objections. In the past the objection has always been that the bureaucrats might exercise undue influence on Members of Congress and that the party out of power might use the plan to heckle and embarrass the party in power.

Question: Would you comment on the experience of Mr. John Blandford during the war in keeping Congress informed of the operations of his agency?

Representative Kefauver: Mr. Blandford and Representative Lanham, who was chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, worked out an arrangement whereby once a month Mr. Blandford would come up with his assistants and sit down with the Committee, not for the purpose of discussing any particular legislation, but just to tell them how the housing situation stood, what they were doing, what the problems were, and at the same time to get the benefit of criticism or suggestions from the committee. The relationship between Mr. Blandford and the Committee, including members on both sides, was very cordial and the result was that he usually got what he wanted insofar as that committee was concerned. It is a very worth-while study for departments that are interested in keeping good relations with the Congressional committees. It is the sort of thing that should be done more extensively than it is.

NATIONAL-STATE RELATIONS DURING THE WAR

by

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You remember the story of the politician who was riding on the rear platform of a day coach. When the conductor told him it was against the rules, he retorted, "What, isn't a platform something to stand on?" "No, sir," said the conductor, "a platform is something to get in on."

It is somewhat the same with the title of a book or a lecture. It is just a way of getting into the subject. Of course, tastes and standards in such matters are subject to wide variations. A minister once said that a text is something to depart from, but if one is at all conscientious a text or a title may be rather confining. Take the title of this evening's lecture, for example. At first I worded it thus: "The Effects of the War upon National-State Relations." That title I rejected. It might easily have led me far away into a discussion of causes and effects, and so on into the philosophical abstractions of causation in general. After all, the question "What causes that?" is almost, if not quite, unanswerable. I am glad not to have to decide what effects the war had upon national-state relations.

But am I any better off with the present title "National-State Relations During the War"? What is war and what is the duration thereof? Thomas Hobbes had something to say on that subject three centuries ago in the *Leviathan* (Chapter 13). I quote:

Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For "war" consisteth not in battle only or

the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known, and therefore the notion of "time" is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is "peace."

If Hobbes is right, war may actually begin long before any formal declaration or any overt attack, and continue long after peace has been proclaimed. Nature, it is said, makes no jumps. In a sense this is true also of all great social movements. The life of nations flows on in all its variety and complexity unbroken by the transition to the legal state of war and again to peace. The formal declaration of war may make little difference in fact, and the formal proclamation of peace even less. Today (November, 1946) the United States is still technically in a state of war, although many persons of good intelligence and more than average information are probably unaware of the fact.

National-State Relations at the Beginning of the War

To understand what happened to national-state relations during that part of the war lies behind us and that began with certain events in Europe about 1938-39, we must first take a look at some trends that began much earlier. Since at least as far back as the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the nation has seen a strong trend toward the expansion of governmental functions--national, state, and local--with a parallel movement toward centralization in Washington (partly at the expense of the states) and centralization in the state capitols (partly at the expense of local governments). The expansion of governmental functions was very rapid in a few periods, 1913-1918, 1933-1937, and 1941-1945; and at each of these times there was a corresponding centralization of

public services. These three periods correspond roughly with two world wars and one of the world's worst depressions. The most rapid and sweeping movement toward national collectivism and social services took place in the early and middle 1930's, the period of the great depression and the New Deal. The powerful drive toward a "social service state" that was made at that time was not anticapitalist. Indeed, the New Deal helped both to reform and to bolster up the system of private enterprise in the United States.

More than that, the New Deal program, although a nationalizing one, also strengthened both state and local governments. It gave them more to do in such fields as public planning, public works, public housing, relief, and social security. It gave them financial aid and improved their solvency and their credit ratings. It induced them to raise their standards in public-service personnel and in other aspects of public administration. As they grew stronger, more active, and more nearly solvent, the states in particular became more self-assured and more assertive of their rights. Both the states and the local governments at this time showed their gratitude for what had been done for them, as children often do, by a perverseness in fiscal policies that was a serious handicap to the New Deal and the national administration. While the national policy was to put more men to work and to prime the economic pump by increased borrowing and expenditures, many state and local governments reduced expenditures, laid off employees, and endeavored to reduce their debts.

By 1938 or 1939 a reaction against New Deal policies had sprung up in many states. Strong resentment was expressed against national interference, and especially against what was called bureaucratic interference, in state and local affairs. The New Deal program had injected into the administrative network in all parts of the Union a whole series of new district, state, and regional representatives of the national government. Local officials in many places were highly allergic to these injections. Their local resentments received vigorous and frequent expression in the halls of Congress, where it had been all too soon forgotten that Congress had

itself enacted the laws under which national administrators were endeavoring to hold the states in line in the administration of functions to which the national government was lending aid.

How soon the political tide would have turned against the national administration and its program had not other events intervened it is impossible to say. By the summer of 1940 the war in Europe was going so badly for the nations that were traditionally friendly to the United States that public attention had to be transferred largely away from domestic affairs to military defense and international policies. The trend of national-state relations during the fighting part of the war, roughly from 1941 to past the middle of 1945, cannot be adequately understood without recalling that Franklin Roosevelt, though his administration had already aroused strong resentment and opposition in many states, was reelected to the Presidency for a third and then a fourth term of office, in 1940 and in 1944. His majority in Congress was often threatened and at times it melted away owing to defections within his own party. His success in being reelected did not mean that all parts of the nation had wholeheartedly accepted all the new administrative agencies.

When the war came to the United States, yes, even in the "defense period" before Pearl Harbor, the state and local governments revealed their complete loyalty to the cause of national defense. They felt compelled not only to yield to the national government full control over war policy, but also to participate actively in all that needed to be done for a successful prosecution of the struggle. This did not mean that they had given up their resentments against what they called the national bureaucracy. Indeed, they saw to it that Congress inserted into various acts of wartime centralization specific clauses that limited the exercise of extraordinary war powers strictly to the duration of the war and that further provided for the return to the state and local governments at war's end of state and local powers and properties that were taken over by the nation for wartime purposes. The President himself keenly recognized this situation, and when the state employment services were taken over by the United States Employment Service, he stipulated that

these services were to be returned to the states at the end of the war.

Wartime Programs Administered by the States

Although repeated warnings of impending war had been given, the national government was not prepared to establish quickly over the entire nation the administrative agencies that were needed for a total war. With all its various agencies spread thinly over the whole country, the national government did not have enough staff to handle all the new work. It was as necessary as it was wise to call upon state and local governments and upon volunteer citizen efforts in all communities to get the wartime services performed. Every part of American society and of the governmental system was mobilized for the war effort.

The first approach was, naturally enough, to the states. In the decade before Pearl Harbor the state governments had been building up a central secretariat in the Council of State Governments, the Governors' Conference, and affiliated agencies, with headquarters in Chicago and in Washington. Aware of this means of contact with the states, the national administration called upon the Council secretariat for cooperation. Conferences were held on short notice, and telegrams were used to reach all the states when decisions on joint action had been reached. The cutting off of rubber imports necessitated immediate rationing of automobile tires. Stimulated by patriotic motives and assisted by the Council of State Governments, the state governors established tire and mileage rationing boards in practically every county in the nation within a month after Pearl Harbor. Sugar rationing followed the same pattern. The Selective Service Act had already assigned the responsibility for carrying out the act to the governors of the states. Control of automobile speeds as a means of tire conservation was also established by the states in agreement with the national authorities. Not only the various state speed laws, but also those on truck sizes and loads were in effect set aside for the duration by the governors under agreements

with the national authorities. The right of the governors thus in effect to dispense with established laws seems not to have been seriously questioned in any high court. The urgency of wartime needs, and the feeling that if forced to it the national government could itself establish uniform highway regulations, led to a general acceptance of the restrictions imposed by the governors.

When the program of civilian defense had been devised it was also delegated to the states to operate, and they in turn through their defense councils assigned the work largely to local governments and to volunteer citizen groups. The national Office of Civilian Defense served mainly as a planning, coordinating, and stimulating agency.

In all these programs, it goes almost without saying, the national government supplied some if not all of the needed funds. The expenses were not high because citizens throughout the nation responded splendidly to the calls for volunteer and unpaid service. Hundreds of thousands of persons participated actively in selective service, price control, and rationing boards and in civilian defense services, scrap drives, and other war-related functions. It took the war to illustrate once more that the old spirit of the universal obligation to serve is not dead and that many public services can be achieved by the "neighborly public spirit" described by Bernard Bosanquet, a spirit that is always of the essence of public administration in small communities. The wonder is how quickly this spirit can be organized for action on a national scale.

All the services thus organized under state and local control had considerable initial success. It soon appeared, however, in the field of rationing and price control that the inevitable local variations in policies and practice were endangering the whole program. This led to a movement that soon brought this whole phase of administration under national control through the Office of Price Administration. The local rationing boards became part of a fairly uniform national system.

Civilian defense, on the other hand, remained under state control. Its importance soon diminished, however, and the attacks in Congress and elsewhere upon the

Office of Civilian Defense at the national level, coupled with internal difficulties and shifts of policy in the national agency, brought serious discouragement to the local boards and workers. Surprisingly enough, despite these difficulties the local organizations carried on enthusiastically in many places. A number of them have developed into permanent citizen councils for coordinating community activities.

Selective Service was a success throughout the war under state and local administration. This is a rather surprising fact, because superficially, at least, its basic system of quotas and calls or requisitions upon the states looks very much like the system that failed so miserably to raise an adequate army under the Articles of Confederation in the War for Independence. For each month or each call, every state received a notice as to the number of men it should supply, and these quotas were filled almost every time. Why was this system so successful in 1941-1945, and so unsuccessful in 1776-1781? The answer is that the conditions were almost entirely different. In 160 years since independence was achieved the United States had become a nation with a strong national government. The Selective Service Act was a single national statute, with stiff penalties for violations. A national agency having headquarters in Washington and staffed mainly by Army officers was responsible for interpreting and applying the law and for supervising its administration in the states. This agency was backed up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States district attorneys, and the United States courts, for the apprehension, prosecution, and trial of draft law evaders. The state selective-service officers, although appointed by the governors and to some extent subject to their supervision, were themselves mostly Army officers who were subject to Army discipline. Under such circumstances there could not be much deviation from the rules of Selective Service or lack of zeal in carrying out the law.

The governors in a few cases made efforts to induce the draft boards to defer married men or agricultural workers, for example, but on the whole they had little effect on the rules. A more persistent difficulty arose

out of the relative independence of the local draft boards and their failure to observe uniform standards of selection and induction. These boards consisted of local civilians who were chosen by state officials. Under these boards men in almost identical circumstances were drafted in one district and not drafted in an adjoining one. Appeals from local board decisions went first to the state offices of Selective Service, and most of them were settled there. In this way the "heat" that might otherwise have been engendered was localized and largely dissipated. Relatively little of it reached the Washington office of Selective Service. Even when appeals were taken to national headquarters it could be pointed out with some truth that the governor was the head of the state's Selective Service administration, and that the responsibility rested with state and local officials. In order not to permit any doubts to arise concerning the reality of state and local control, the National Director of Selective Service was careful to see to it that even the regional officers did not interfere with decisions and operations at the state and local levels.

Before we turn to another phase of the subject, a word might be said about a function that was handled quite differently. During World War I and the years immediately following it, all the states passed and enforced their own legislation on espionage, sedition, sabotage, and related offenses. The results were great confusion, surprising differences among the states in the treatment of similar acts, numerous prosecutions, and extensive suppression of the ordinary freedoms of speech and press. At the beginning of World War II, with the aid of the Council of State Governments, an agreement was reached between the United States Department of Justice and the state attorneys general and other law-enforcing officers whereby the states left practically this whole function to the national government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation did most of the investigating, the United States district attorneys and the Department of Justice did the prosecuting under Congressional legislation applicable to the whole country, and the United States courts heard the cases. From the viewpoint of civil liberties the results were ever so much better than in World War I. This

was due in part, no doubt, to the more advanced views on civil liberties of the Supreme Court during World War II.

Community Services

When the national government began to organize its own wartime services on a nation-wide basis, reaching into every community, considerable confusion developed in many local areas. Each new agency set up its own field service, with officials in charge who had been trained very sketchily or not at all. Each of these men knew his own agency's program to some extent, but probably very few of them knew much about other agencies and their work. Neither did they know each other personally. As they began to gather and go to work in the leading centers, the result was much overlapping of activities and in some cases conflict, a condition that stemmed in part from the unavoidable confusion then current in Washington but that had some of its main effects in the localities. Adverse criticisms of the government's conduct of the war arose partly out of these localized instances of confusion.

Striking examples arose in connection with community services in the more crowded war-production centers. Some of these centers doubled and even trebled in population within a few months. The state and local governments were in most instances wholly unprepared to meet the increased needs for housing, health and sanitary services, schools, recreation, child care, and other community services. Congress and the national administration made satisfactory provisions, in general, for the nation to pay for the required services.

The following important national agencies, among others, became somewhat involved in this matter of community services:

War Manpower Commission, Bureau of Manpower Utilization, Plant and Community Services Section. This section operated rather unevenly in various centers, but one of its purposes was to discover

community service needs affecting workers and to bring these to the attention of other agencies.

War Production Board, Office of Civilian Requirements, Government Division. The Office of Civilian Requirements endeavored to determine civilian needs, including local government needs, for controlled goods and services and to allocate such goods as could be spared from the available supplies.

War Production Board, Office of Labor Production, Plant and Community Facilities Service. This service had the responsibility, among others, of stimulating production in war plants through plant and community services and programs. It attempted in several production centers to coordinate the work of other government agencies in providing for community facilities with results somewhat less than successful, and not without creating some friction.

Federal Security Agency, Office of Community War Services. The Office of Community War Services was established "to serve as a center for the coordination of health and welfare services for the nation as a whole during the war emergency." Its particular duty was "to focus attention on unmet needs in localities expanded or otherwise affected by the war program and to help in marshaling the public and private resources of federal, state, and local agencies" so that the needed services would be provided. (U. S. Government Manual, 1945, 2d ed., p. 418.)

Federal Works Agency. This agency had a responsibility under the wartime Lanham Act to construct certain public works needed for promoting wartime production and also to contribute funds to other public agencies and certain nonprofit private agencies for the same purpose. In short, it had responsibilities for constructing and financing

certain community facilities, whereas the other agencies mentioned above were concerned mainly with stimulating and coordinating activities in this field.

Here were five national bureaus, two in one agency, each of which had some authority with respect to community facilities in war production areas. The result was what might have been expected: confusion as to authority, lack of adequate planning, disagreements, and friction. The officers of the local governments did not know with whom to deal. No officer of the national government had any real authority to bring about the necessary teamwork.

There was not only overlapping and conflict. In one case a congested war production area badly needed a water supply, but no agency of the national administration was willing to help out until weeks had passed and many urgent appeals had been made. A study of this situation was made by a person not in the national service. He proposed that a coordinator with authority over all national agencies in the locality be set up in each major production area. In other circles there was talk of setting up in the Executive Office of the President a field-coordinating service to deal directly with the problems of national-state relations. What was created instead was the President's Committee for Congested Production Areas under the chairmanship of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Other members of the Committee were the undersecretaries of War and Navy and the heads of the War Production Board, Federal Works Agency, National Housing Agency, and War Manpower Commission.

Under this Committee a director, Mr. Corrington Gill, and a staff of about 80 members worked from early 1943 to the end of 1944. It limited its activities to the 18 most congested production areas. It had no operating responsibilities whatever, and practically no authority. Its function was to serve all the national governmental agencies and all the state and local governments in these areas as an expeditor and coordinator in the adjustment of community difficulties that were hampering production.

Housing, health, sanitation, water supply, hospitals, schools, child-care, recreation, transportation, even food, fuel, and laundry services came within its jurisdiction. Its method was to bring together the national, state, and local officials, and all others who were concerned with pressing community problems, to get a meeting of minds, and then to help speed up action in Washington and elsewhere.

Each staff member was carefully selected. The area representatives were men with experience in dealing with local governments and with problems of community services and facilities. It was the policy of C.C.P.A. to appoint local residents as area representatives. The liaison officers on the Washington staff all had long government experience and the 'know how' of dealing with federal agencies. (Final Report, December, 1944, p. 5.)

The Committee seems to have had very considerable success during its short life, although its activities cannot be measured in ordinary operating terms. Its whole method of approach is certainly worthy of further trial. Of course, it came upon the scene rather late, after many local needs had been met. Had it existed earlier it might have been even more valuable.

Grants-in-Aid

The war period saw a considerable increase in national grants-in-aid to state governments and, to some extent, to local units. New developments included day-care centers for children whose mothers worked in munitions plants, more public housing, school lunches, community facilities, payments for army, navy, and air corps training (including training for military government), highways to munitions plants, and others. Late in the war Congress also enacted provisions for aiding the states in highway planning, an airports program (which followed an interesting contest between the states and the cities), and an act for the disposal of surplus war assets under which state and local governments have high priorities.

None of these introduced any distinctly new principles, but several of them will probably lead to permanent increases in state and local functions (e.g., airports and child-care centers).

New Theories of National-State Relations

The war brought increased emphasis with respect to the need for administrative coordination among the agencies in Washington, between each Washington agency and its field service, and among the various national field services in the many local communities where two or more such agencies had local representatives. Reference may be made to the still young Field Service of the Bureau of the Budget and the Committee for Congested Production Areas, and to the lectures on Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service given in the fall of 1941 before the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture. The relations between national agencies in the field and the state and local governments, and also the relations among the state and local governments themselves, have also come in for a great deal of study. The Council on Intergovernmental Relations has conducted three demonstration projects since about 1941 in one county each in Minnesota, Indiana, and Georgia. (This Council ceased to function in 1948.) The Council of State Governments has engaged in several important investigations of intergovernmental relations. Recently a five-year project for the study of the intergovernmental relations of Minnesota was begun under my direction at the University of Minnesota. These are but a few signs of an increasing awareness on the part of many administrators and students of administration that the time has come for significant adjustments in the operating relations among national, state, and local governments.

During the 1930's and 1940's, also, new theories of national-state relations have been in process of development. The Supreme Court has given repeated expression to the view that the national and state governments are not by nature required to be antagonistic to each

other; that there is need for both in the American political system; and that they must learn to cooperate and to adjust themselves to each other's existence. By its decisions in recent years the Court has brought the national government more fully than ever into the protection of civil liberties and the regulation of industry and agriculture under the guise of commerce. Mention may be made also of its decisions on the navigability of waterways and on insurance as interstate commerce. At the same time, the states have been upheld in regulations of commerce and in the taxation of certain firms, corporations, and facilities engaged in the service of the nation. The struggle in Congress over the act providing federal aid for airports, although it ended in a compromise between state and municipal interests, reveals the fact that many persons are now willing to face frankly the fact that the national government may properly deal directly with the larger cities without being required to clear everything through state channels.

On the other hand, the director of the Council of State Governments, Mr. Frank Bane, who has been most active in bringing about friendly and fruitful cooperation between the national and state governments, has come forward with a somewhat different suggestion, as follows:

The old distinction between levels of government--reserving the programs most closely affecting the persons and property of citizens to the states and localities and entrusting the programs of national consequence to the central government--was a valid one in its time. The distinction cannot be made on the basis of programs today, for modern technology, modern economics, and modern communications have made nearly every program of government a concern of federal, state, and local authorities alike. But within each program a distinction can be made as to type of administrative activity or function: for example, the federal authority can determine those matters of most general concern, the broad policies and regulations; the state can take responsibility for organization and supervision and direction; and the locality can

operate the program with respect to individual cases. Thus the relationship of the individual to national policy will be in the hands of those who best know local circumstances and are best able to judge individual cases, while at the other extreme the national authority will be free to devote its entire attention to broad issues of policy. (2 Public Administration Review, 100-101, Spring, 1942.)

There is obviously a close parallel between this theory and that which has long controlled state-local relations in the United States.

Mr. Bane had in mind the early phases of the tire and sugar rationing programs in which something of this kind was done. How far he would extend the application of his idea does not clearly appear, but he does not expressly say that even some functions that are now exclusively national might not be administered in this new way. Neither does he discuss the political and partisan implications of his proposal or indicate whether he thinks the plan would work just as well in peace as in times of war. A general application of his proposal to all functions at all times would result in very important changes in the entire federal system. State and local governments would have much more to do, but they would also be bound to the wheel of the national government more tightly than they ever have been in the past, even in wartime.

Meanwhile, the experiences of recent years clearly indicate that the national government needs to coordinate its various programs of activity in Washington far better than it has done, and also to improve its communications and relations with the field. At the state and local level it needs also to invent and to apply methods of coordination in the field on a basis that will recognize the work of the state and local governments. In too many instances in the past, national agencies in the field have worked at cross purposes with each other and without due regard to state and local needs, services, and susceptibilities. This has gone so far in some services as practically to force the creation of new local authorities and districts under national supervision in complete

disregard of the existing pattern of local government. This is not the way to endear the national government to the people at the grass roots or to contribute to the strengthening of local democracy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be said that during World War II there have been many changes in detail in the relations between the national and state governments and numerous interesting episodes and experiences. At the same time, nothing has happened that is of as great importance as the adoption of Amendments Fourteen and Fifteen at the end of the Civil War. Most of the recent changes have been projections of trends that began in the ten years before Pearl Harbor or even earlier. The swing back from national to state control in important fields such as the Employment Service is also nothing entirely new. After the Civil War came the Supreme Court decisions that limited the national government's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, and after World War I came a "return to normalcy" that strongly de-emphasized the role of the national government in the control of the national economy. It is not inconceivable that the pendulum will swing too far so that the national government will be caught off balance and unprepared when the next national emergency has to be faced.

INFORMING THE PEOPLE

by

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America during World War II was the best informed wartime nation in the history of the world. At the same time, it retained its freedom of press and freedom of speech and by that accomplishment made even more secure those rights so dear to the heart of every American. If America faced a staggering demand to build and man an unprecedented war machine while still reeling from the blow at Pearl Harbor, it faced an equally important and far-reaching task in preparing mentally and psychologically for the grim days ahead. Like so many other phases of World War II, this latter task lead into new fields.

The Office of War Information

The important thing, naturally, was to fix firmly the objective, and that was done in unmistakable language by President Roosevelt in Executive Order 9182 of June 13, 1942, consolidating foreign and domestic information functions of the Government into the Office of War Information. The opening sentence of the order made it clear that it was "in recognition of the right of the American people and of all other people opposing the Axis aggressors to be truthfully informed about the common war effort . . ." Elmer Davis, Director of OWI, emphasized this when he said "The Office of War Information owes its existence solely to the war and was established to serve as one of the instruments by which the war will be won."

The war still is much too fresh for proper historical evaluation of the part information played in the victory. Differences of opinion will exist not only with respect to the effectiveness of the operation but also as to the basic organization, as well as the methods used to carry it out. OWI was destined to have a hectic life. It did. It was destined to be misunderstood. It was. This was inevitable. The reasons are many and I will not go into them now.

There is one point, however, which needs to be made and which has not been made with sufficient force up to this time. Only a few know it, so perhaps that is the reason. Anyway, the point is that Elmer Davis fought throughout the life of the Office of War Information for complete public information at home and abroad, within the limits of national security. He was a vigorous champion of the rights of the people to be informed and the rights of the press and radio to inform them. He never wavered. Experience in conducting the wartime informational assignment was invaluable in meeting the extremely serious problem incident to the closing of the war. Incipient fears as the shooting ended were matters of the greatest concern. No apology need ever be made for the manner in which this phase of the operation was conducted. The initial transition was astoundingly smooth. Again, the American public was the best informed in the history of the world.

The Government at the beginning of the war was not equipped for the kind of information job which had to be done. The manner in which that job was done is an outstanding tribute to the press, radio, motion pictures, and advertising and other industries and forms a thrilling chapter in the history of the war. I believe there is a lesson to be learned in the way this team operated and I am sure it was the means of bringing about a better mutual understanding that will be of lasting benefit. The many facets of the job encompassed the entire population in one form or another. It was that big. Broadly speaking, it was necessary to provide information on the conduct of the war so the public would be kept abreast of developments. It was also necessary to advise the American public as to how they could be helpful in winning the war by doing certain things and by not doing

certain things. In other words, one concerned spot news, the other concerned the plans for the advertising phase of the program.

The early days of the war found the Government carrying on the information job through the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports, the Division of Information in the Office for Emergency Management, and others, but President Roosevelt decided after a few months that the work would have to be coordinated by one agency. He created the Office of War Information by Executive Order on June 13, 1942. He gave it sweeping authority.

The Director was instructed to "formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government."

He was directed to "coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies . . ." Further, he was authorized "to issue such directives as he may deem necessary," and "to establish by regulation the types and classes of informational programs and releases which shall require clearance and approval by his office prior to dissemination."

He was given authority to "require the curtailment or elimination of any Federal information service, program, or release which he deems to be wasteful or not directly related to the prosecution of the war effort."

The Wartime Information Programs

A number of pressing jobs demanded simultaneous attention. The American people were tremendously interested in information about their allies as well as their enemies. They were hungry for news about themselves.

They were assured that they would receive the news not only of an immediate nature but also the background information so necessary for understanding what the news is about. The American people always give

wholehearted support provided the request is precise and is justified. The more they understood what the war was about, the harder they worked and fought to win it. Verification of this is found in a review of the information program.

In looking back, you become more and more impressed with the understanding spirit of the public. You perceive, on careful scrutiny of the many things the people did and did not do to win the war, an indication of how ready and willing they were to go all the way. Perhaps the best means of emphasizing the scope of the domestic informational job is to mention some of the specific programs, messages, admonitions, etc., of that period.

Rationing was among the first. It introduced into America a system which would inevitably dislocate the normal economic business pattern. We all know what a tremendous effect it had. But at that time it was new in this country. The American public wanted to know, as you and I wanted to know, what was to be rationed, why it was to be rationed, and how it was to be rationed. Now, there is a great distinction between the asking of the questions and answering them when the answers must be made to reach 135 million people. It becomes doubly difficult when those answers must penetrate and dispel misinformation, confusion, and rumor.

Food, of course, had to be watched constantly because of the increasing needs of our fighting forces and our allies. The story was dramatically simple, which, of course, can be said for practically every great story. Food is a weapon of war. We had to be sure that the fighting men were kept strong. We had to make certain the people behind the lines, the civilians at home, received a fair share so their health and strength would be maintained. The only way to insure this was to establish a system by which each civilian would fare on equal terms with all others.

Production of food immediately became more important than ever before. We had to feed our military forces on more than 60 battle fronts. The farmer couldn't possibly meet this demand without plenty of help. So that presented another problem and another program. The steps taken to meet it--and it was met--included

recruiting of labor for the farms through patriotic appeals and the promotion of victory gardens throughout the country.

Conservation of food offered an opportunity for successful informational work. A survey of 247 cities disclosed that 250 pounds of garbage was collected for each individual every year, and 100 pounds of edible food per person was wasted in the home each year. Or, more graphically stated, a slice or two of wasted bread a week in each home equals 2 million loaves, and so on. In a land where this kind of waste was going on it was obvious that action was needed without delay. That action could come only from the American public itself. The public would act only if it saw the need for action. It did see the need; it did act. And it will always act when there is a need for action and when that need is made clear.

For the first time conservation of natural resources became a vital necessity to millions of Americans. Each day of the war saw continuing need for more industrial production, and production depended on manpower, fuels, materials, and equipment. This meant competition between the war production program and the civilian in such things as coal, oil, gas, electricity, water, communications, transportation, etc. As an example, it was estimated that a 10 percent reduction in domestic and commercial use of coal for heating alone would save over 20 million tons annually. A 10 percent reduction in the use of manufactured gas would save over 1,500,000 barrels of fuel oil. A 10 percent reduction in domestic and commercial use of electricity would save over 4 million tons of coal or its equivalent, and more than 75 million lamp bulbs.

These and many other facts bearing directly on the subject brought about the willing cooperation of the American public. However, it was necessary to have specific suggestions as to how the public could help. That was the reason for various conservation programs. One was called "Six Ways to Save Coal," to be accomplished by not heating unused rooms, keeping windows closed and keeping temperature down, removing radiator covers, drawing drapes at night, heat-sealing your home, checking

furnace for leaks and firing methods, not wasting hot water. Specific suggestions also were given for the conservation of gas which involved cooking, refrigeration, heating, etc.

Transportation conservation became extremely critical and, in fact, still remains somewhat of a problem with respect to rail transportation. That part of it which the public will long remember had to do with the family automobile. An interesting development concerned the importance of the individual automobile to the transportation system necessary in the American economy. The conservation program as regards the family automobile was a point of minor conflict even while the desired result was being accomplished. By that I mean that the automobile as such was conserved through tire conservation, tire rationing, gasoline rationing, etc., rather than through the conservation of the entire automobile as a unit of transportation. The reason for the controversy was that one agency insisted that the entire automobile was of primary importance and should be conserved by limiting its mileage, while another agency was equally insistent that the conservation through rationing be confined to specific items such as gasoline and tires. Incidentally, the point has not been resolved.

The black-market operations in gasoline were the target of one major program. Counterfeiting contributed to the problem, and at one period was regarded as a serious menace to our whole war effort. Stern measures had to be taken, but first of all the public was fully informed and, therefore, understood when the crackdown came.

Safety was the basis of a continuing program, in collaboration with practically every Federal agency. Its importance emerged from the shadow to the forefront when it was considered in relation to the various war efforts. Accidents were destroying men and material. The casualties on the home front between Pearl Harbor and January 1, 1945, were 296,000 killed and 30 million injured, with one million of the injured suffering permanent disability. In 1944, 36,000 American soldiers were injured in this country, not by the enemy but by accidents. It was necessary, therefore, to ask the American public

to be more careful in order to save manpower, hospital space, doctors' and nurses' time, automobiles and other necessary machinery. It was a little different from the usual "safety first" campaigns all of us had seen in previous years. Now it really meant that it had to be done.

Some campaigns were necessary to garner critical materials. Scrap iron was entirely too valuable to have lying around to rust. The response of the American people when this need was told remains one of the bright chapters in the salvage program. The tin can had to be lifted from the garbage can to a place of distinction. The housewife was ready and willing once she understood why. It was only necessary to recite the shortage of our supply, the fact that Japan had captured 70 percent of the world's tin production and that our one source for building up our supply was the tin can itself. True, it was necessary to recite the indispensability of tin in the preservation of medicine, blood plasma, food, airplanes, torpedoes, submarines, etc.

The conservation of textiles and leather and of clothing was accomplished all through the same basic formula. Waste paper certainly achieved a higher standing in the American home than it had ever had. It did so because the American home learned that waste paper constituted a great military need. The 81 tons of supplies a month for each man overseas alone demanded huge quantities of paper containers. "K" rations were packed in folding cartons. Paperboard protected every shell. Once that story was understood, the program was successful.

Recruiting campaigns were of such variety as to appeal to everyone. The drives to recruit WACS, SPARS, WAVES, nurses and nurses' aides, and civilian defense and farm and forest workers were under way continuously. One program was started in July, 1944, with the objective of transferring 100,000 farm workers to woods industries during the winter off-season period because of the urgency then existing in logging, pulpwood cutting, lumbering, and sawmills. The lumber supply and basic timber products had become inadequate to assure the filling of requirements. Seasonally a forest-fire program was vigorously pushed. War-loan drives received enthusiastic support.

The campaign to safeguard information which might assist the enemy was a continuing program unmatched in the history of our country. It was a demonstration of public faith in the Government, but more than that it was a demonstration of the wonderful common sense of the American people. A security committee composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Maritime Commission, and Office of Civilian Defense approved programs prepared by the Office of War Information, while the Office of Censorship set up voluntary codes for newspapers and radio. I can think of no other phase of the domestic program where there was such positive evidence of unity of purpose and accomplishment. The press and the radio set an example which, in my opinion, needs to be retold from time to time.

Morale in the armed services provided the basis for informational activity at home. One example concerned overseas mail. Mail from home was a military necessity. Reminders to those at home were given from time to time and were found to have remarkable effect.

From the very beginning of the war we gave special emphasis to the broad problem of economic stabilization and developed numerous programs stemming from it. Inflation was held up to the public in the first year of the war as a danger which the people alone could forestall. It was brought out that basic raw materials in the United States rose by 67 percent, wholesale prices by 32 percent, and living costs by 19 percent between the invasion of Poland in 1939 and August, 1942. A disastrous rising spiral in the cost of living was foreseen unless the people cooperated. The explanation of the meaning of inflation was stated in terms everyone could understand; that inflation simply means demand is greater than the supply of things to be bought. The public was asked to exercise restraint, and by and large it did so to a remarkable degree. But this problem had to be attacked from every conceivable angle and it became more important as the war drew to a close. Income taxes had to be explained. Planned spending and saving had to be urged. Farmers and the fight against inflation constituted a

program in itself. The economics of inflation were explained and also the "why" of the economic stabilization program. Past periods of inflation were examined and publicized as a means of emphasizing the importance of the program.

Inflationary dangers in the postwar period were examined for the benefit of the American public. One of the last of such programs was entitled, "The Job Ahead on the Economic Front," which was prepared in cooperation with the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, Office of Economic Stabilization, Office of Price Administration, War Labor Board, and Department of Agriculture. It ended on the theme that anti-inflation measures will work in peace as in war only if the people want them to work and give them their support.

One task which enabled the Office of War Information to demonstrate what could be accomplished where willing cooperation prevailed was in the handling of the casualty lists for both Army and Navy. It was the first time in the history of the country that a combined list of casualties was issued. I know that it was beneficial to all concerned. I regret that it was terminated by one department of Government, which insisted on returning to a dual operation where one had worked much better.

Demobilization

The transition from war to peace was recognized by all as a period of delicacy, although I do not believe anyone foretold precisely what would happen. A major problem in this respect concerned the demobilization of the war-industry workers. Rumors would spread concerning lay-offs and would contribute in large measure to a demoralization in the workers' ranks. A great deal of work went into the preparation of what was called a "Cutback Field Guide" designed to handle this problem effectively through coordination of all interested agencies. It was necessary to see that the announcement of a cutback in any particular plant was made simultaneously to management and labor and the public in order to avert an epidemic of rumors and the resultant confusion and fear.

The last program, as I recall, was the veterans information program, which had two broad aims: one was to inform the veteran, his family, and the public of veterans' rights, benefits, and privileges and to tell where and how the returning serviceman or woman might get them; the other was to make the veterans' readjustment to civilian life easier by providing the information necessary to combat possible misunderstandings between veterans and civilians. That program, prepared in cooperation with all interested Federal agencies, constituted one of the best jobs on one of the most important problems in the closing days of the war, prepared with full realization that it would be the number one problem long after OWI was out of business.

How the Job Was Done

The organization necessary for the informational jobs of the war couldn't possibly have been started from scratch, even if we had wanted to build one entirely of Government employees, which would have been impossible. Rather, it was a merging of all the privately-owned media of public expression for the one purpose of prosecuting to conclusion a world war. In this organization alone there is a grand example of how this country can establish and maintain a solid front, unyielding under the heaviest pressure. I believe I can best illustrate by describing one program and how we handled it. Food is a good case. The Government agencies which determined policy in this instance were the War Food Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Petroleum Administration for War. The Office of War Information served as the coordinator of all interests in preparing one information program. It then became the responsibility of OWI to submit the information to the American public. And this is what was available to do the job:

Radio--Many privately sponsored radio programs of all kinds--dramatic, commentator, spot,

quiz, musical--carried messages on the subject. During one month's drive alone they carried messages to approximately 715,055,000 listeners.

Newspapers--Day-to-day coverage in the nation's newspapers by regular press releases in 1,894 daily newspapers with approximately 41 million readers and in 1,483 trade journals with approximately 9 million readers. Rural press coverage reached 42 million readers; the foreign-language division, approximately 25 million; the labor press, approximately 12 million; the Negro press, approximately 4 million. A mat list went to 2,367 editors, chiefly of house organs.

Magazines--Through the monthly Magazine War Guide, the publication of articles on victory gardens, nutrition, etc., was encouraged in 520 magazines with a total circulation of 138,622,102.

Motion Pictures--The two ten-minute shorts, "Food and Magic" and "America's Hidden Weapon," both produced by Warner Brothers, were distributed by the War Activities Committee of the motion-picture industry to 16,000 theatres with an estimated audience of 85 million.

Car Cards--More than 150,000 cards were placed in local buses, streetcars, subway, elevated, and suburban trains.

Posters--160,000 posters were distributed to schools, colleges, clubs, women's organizations, public buildings, office buildings, etc.

Outdoor--24-sheet posters were exhibited on approximately 3,500 outdoor billboards through local sponsorship.

Retail--Through the Retailers' War Program, leading stores throughout the country were encouraged to support the victory-garden drive in their displays and advertising.

Special Localized Drives--Plan books for locally organized and sponsored drives in 3,000 counties were prepared for distribution by the Department of Agriculture.

Advertising--Through the War Advertising Council, scores of advertisements were prepared for local

sponsorship and millions of dollars worth of space was contributed by private advertisers to help stimulate food production and conservation.

The mention of advertising last is not to be taken as an indication of its standing on the team. The War Advertising Council did a job which perhaps never will be overshadowed by any other in the life of advertising. The cooperation extended by advertisers through the Council made the task even more inspiring and brought results which otherwise could not possibly have been achieved.

The VE-Day Report

The transition period is here with all the perplexities one might expect, but remarkably free of the major disasters forecast by many prophets at the close of the Pacific war. A public information program intelligently planned by the Government must be credited for a large measure of this condition. The formula--a very simple one--called for an examination by Federal departments and agencies of the impact of peace on their operations, and for recommendations for action. This information was assembled by the Office of War Information and provided a comprehensive economic picture of broad scope which enabled the Government, through Judge Vinson, then Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, to give to the public a report which won immediate nation-wide acclaim for its soundness, logic, and frankness. I believe it had a tremendous influence on the industrial and economic situation at a critical time. It may sound easy; actually it required a lot of time and work by the top men and their staffs.

I am going to take a little time on one point because it illustrates exactly what I want to say. This concerns the Victory-in-Europe Day information program. Now, everyone knew the war in Europe was nearing an end and many of us were concerned about the questions the American public would be asking. How great would be the impact of victory on the United States? After discussion

with Mr. Byrnes, who at the time was serving as Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, a plan was prepared by a committee consisting of Elmer Davis, General Clay (representing Mr. Byrnes), and representatives of the War and Navy Departments. This plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt. An outline was distributed to the heads of 26 government agencies, with the Office of War Information serving as coordinator. That entailed a tremendous amount of detail work, but out of it came an almost perfectly timed series of important events which, in my opinion, constituted a very great public service.

The plan, briefly, was to pose the many and perplexing questions which VE-Day would bring, have them answered frankly and in as much detail as possible by the head of the proper agency, and schedule the issuance of that information over three days to insure the greatest public attention. And it happened that way.

The radio addresses by President Truman and by the five-star generals, the subsequent statements or reports by heads of various government agencies, all were part of a pattern. Next to the President's address, the high light was Judge Vinson's report to the President entitled "The War: Phase Two," which was prepared at Judge Vinson's request by the Office of War Information. When he made it public on VE-Day plus one, it was recognized instantly as a thoughtful document of timely importance to the Nation. It received the top banner headlines in the press. The following day this editorial appeared in the New York Times:

As Director of War Mobilization, Judge Vinson has made a report ostensibly to the President which is really a report to the whole American people. It illustrates how a democracy should function, and it deserves to stand as a model of what such a report should be. It comes on the heels of VE-Day with gratifying promptness. It removes just about as much uncertainty as a single report could remove. It supplies clear and specific answers to questions that millions of men and women throughout the country are beginning to ask themselves.

It answers these questions simply, informally, and unpretentiously, without any trace of bureaucratic jargon, and yet without any "talking down" or any air of patronage. It treats the American people as intelligent adults, able to understand and to abide by any course when its necessity is clearly explained to them.

In this report Americans can learn how far we have gone in reducing Japan's fighting strength and how much still remains to be done. Men already in the Army will learn that it intends to release during the next year about 2,000,000 officers and men. They will be released in accordance with an admirable "point" system evolved from consultation with the men themselves, under which credit will be duly apportioned for total length of service, overseas service, combat service, distinguished service as recognized by decorations awarded, and parenthood status. Youngsters will learn that they will continue to be subject to call into the armed forces for replacement to an extent necessary to keep the net reduction of the Army in the next 12 months at 1,300,000.

Workers, employers, and consumers at home will also find answers in Mr. Vinson's report to their main questions. As war orders decline (Mr. Vinson estimates that the net total cut in war production in the next 3 months will run between 10 and 15 percent as compared with current levels) war workers will lose these particular jobs; but the opportunities opened up by a corresponding expansion of civilian production can supply most of them with jobs of a different kind.

Manufacturers are told under what conditions they may hope to resume production of various civilian goods. Consumers are told to what extent they may begin to expect such things as new washing machines and refrigerators, tires, additional gasoline, and so on. Housewives are warned of continued shortages in meat, sugar, and luxury textiles.

One of the most important warnings by Mr. Vinson concerns the continued need of price and rationing controls, high taxes, and continued war bond

purchases. He recognizes clearly that wartime inflationary pressures will continue after VE-Day; that these pressures will be serious, and that purchasing power will continue to exceed supply. He points out to labor how necessary it will be to hold the Little Steel formula if a dangerous merry-go-round of wage and price increases is to be averted.

The reconversion and transition program outlined by Mr. Vinson will have to be amplified at some points, probably modified at others. But his report is full, courageous, sincere, and, in general, well thought out. It is a provisional chart which can help the country to go ahead with confidence in the job of finishing the war and preparing for the peace.

Judge Vinson was quite appreciative of the work of the Office of War Information and in a letter to Mr. Davis under date of May 16, 1945, he stated:

I want to express my sincere appreciation of the splendid work of the Office of War Information in organizing and coordinating the VE information program.

With victory in Europe approaching, there was grave danger that when VE-Day finally arrived it might be interpreted by a war-weary public as a signal for relaxation in our war effort. To avoid this danger it was the duty of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government to lay before the people, in simple, straight-forward, and orderly fashion, the true story of what VE-Day will mean in terms of military and productive effort and in the way of civilian sacrifice.

This was accomplished with remarkable success. The results speak well, not only for the thought and planning which went into the organization of the VE information program, but for the cooperation of the participating agencies in its effective execution.

Government Information in Peacetime

How much of this is necessary for normal times? What did we learn in the war that is applicable in peace? How far can government go without encroaching on the freedom of the press?

The government requires sufficient machinery, it seems to me, to provide information which the public must have if it is to know what its government is doing and plans to do; if it is to know whether the government is carrying out the will of the people. It certainly can do that without infringing even slightly on the freedom of press or radio, but it is pretty certain that the press and radio will be skeptical and suspicious until convinced there is no ulterior motive. They will remain cautious and watchful, as indeed they are obligated by their great responsibility to do.

Much of the world's trouble stems from misunderstandings. A misstatement or half-truth often provokes a counterstatement, and thus the stage is set for dangerous and reckless action. This is particularly true of our National Government, operating as it does through scores of agencies. Who has not seen one agency of government criticize another and thus start a controversy? How often do these controversies originate from erroneous information or interpretation? In telling you that it is not too difficult for a reporter to start one of these controversies by playing one agency against another, I reveal no professional secret.

The experience I have had in government convinces me that it is possible and sensible for the National Government to operate a central newsroom to:

(A) correlate the factual informational material of the various government agencies, and

(B) make the factual government information available to the press and radio at one or two locations.

The tremendous amount of detail work involved in assembling the information and then cross-checking it with all agencies concerned presents a problem which no single newspaper can meet properly with its staff. The government is just too big for that.

The saving in time devoted to leg work by correspondents, reporters, and radio men is of secondary importance, but it is true that they can do a better job if they have more time to develop their material. It is understood, of course, that the material to be provided by the government itself would be completely factual and designed to form basic information for the news writers and commentators. To this end, each item of information should contain the name and telephone number of the agency and individual in that agency who could provide further information to the press and radio if desired.

The war is over, but our information problems are not. They will remain, but not necessarily in the same state. I am confident that it is easier to conduct an information program during war than it is during peace. The need, however, is just as great. Now, I would be the last person in the world to advocate a controlled Government public information set-up and, as an old newspaperman, I would resent any infringement by the Government on the freedom of the press. I am convinced from personal experience, however, that it is possible for the Government to bring together factual information for use by the media of public information, such as newspapers, radio, magazines, etc.

I wish to emphasize, however, the distinction between factual information, particularly as it affects more than one agency of government, and statements, speeches, and opinions of policy-making members of the government. In short, I believe it is possible for the government to do a coordinated information job without violating freedom of the press or radio. I believe it is easy to do this, provided government itself understands the need for immediate, complete, and frank information.

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT TECHNIQUES

by

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No one person is acquainted with all of the advances in management improvement techniques which were developed during the war. It is also apparent that in any one discussion it would be impossible to touch on all aspects of management improvement techniques. Accordingly, I will deal with certain instances or aspects of the campaign for management improvement which seem to me to be of particular interest at this time. Even with respect to those phases of management improvement activities, I will necessarily touch only on certain significant developments with which I am familiar, and further I shall interpret the term "technique," broadly to include any means or approaches to the end of improving management.

One factor, although not peculiar to wartime experience, is so basic that I think we should start with it. I refer to a real appreciation for and concern with efficient and effective management.

It is fortunate that there was in many of the important war activities a real appreciation for the importance of management. For the basic prerequisite for the improvement of management is a real, driving interest in management on the part of those who have primary responsibility for any given activity. Management cannot be plastered onto an organization, and there are definite limitations to the amount of improvement in management which can be provided solely through the efforts of staff agencies. There are further limitations on the improvement in management which can be secured if the attention of the operators is so overwhelmingly taken up in program objectives that a proportional amount of attention cannot be given to the efficiency of the administrative means of securing the objectives.

There needs to be a balance between the interest in program objectives and the interest in the efficiency of the administrative means. Such balance can be secured when the importance of the means is fully appreciated. Certainly there is always interest in the administrative means, but there is likewise a tendency to throw further resources directly into the program effort rather than to make greater efforts to improve the means by which a given amount of resources (in terms of men, material, and money) can be made to achieve a greater degree of accomplishment in terms of objectives. The interest in tight management of which I speak must be real enough and compelling enough to have the continuing attention and efforts of the operators who are involved. It is not enough to have an academic interest or a general interest in management. It is necessary also to be willing to put aside a proper amount of the time and energy applied to the total operating job to secure an improvement in management. The proper budgeting of time and effort to be applied to management and its improvement is, of course, one of the neat problems of public administration. Further, it is not one which could be answered by any arbitrary percentage, as the answer will depend on time and conditions.

Programs vary but the problems of management, and therefore of management improvement, are basically similar. The features of Government management which are common to the management of all types of activities within the Government might be called the elements or techniques of management. The common elements or techniques of management exist in military operations as well as in civilian activities. I refer, of course, to such processes or phases of management as planning the program, planning the organization, scheduling the program, budgeting the operations, staffing the organization, establishing, maintaining and using the plant (facilities and equipment), establishing procedures and controls, providing administrative services and facilities, establishing and utilizing communications within the organization, motivating the organization, securing evaluation through reports and inspections, establishing work standards, controlling in accord with program and available funds, getting better performance, providing

strong leadership and direction and inspiration, and maintaining external relationships.

Every level of management is concerned with the common phases of management but with a considerable difference in emphasis on the several phases. As the problems of management and the responsibilities for management extend throughout all levels of an organization, all levels must have an interest in management and an understanding of at least those phases of management with which they are most directly concerned.

Top Management

Continuous improvement of management in an agency is dependent largely on an appreciation by top management of the nature of management and the need for its improvement. Such an appreciation has to be coupled with an understanding of the facilities which are available to top management to assist it in the direction and control of the organization.

The first technique for improving management, then, is a technique for getting this top management understanding and interest. I will turn for my illustrations here to two sources--the military and private industry.

The military have developed over a long period a rather systematic approach to securing improvement in organization and direction of military activities and to the related support operations. No doubt as a result of that background, the War Department turned to reorganization and improvement of management facilities and processes as one of the very first steps during the war. Increased attention was given to management in all of the armed forces and at all levels. The management control program of the Army Service Forces, which Major General Robinson described in a talk before the Organization and Procedure Conference of the Department of Agriculture in October, 1944, is a good example.¹ At no time has there been a greater emphasis on

¹ A summary of General Robinson's talk is printed as an appendix to these lectures.

management and management facilities than during the crisis of the war period.

At the end of the war, the armed services turned from emphasis on direct application of management to training of its officers in the higher levels of management. The Air Forces developed the Air University with provision for training all levels from captain to general and the armed forces combined with the State Department to provide top level training at the National War College. Much of the training which is provided to the military in management schools is of general application, as witness the wide use of military personnel in key positions of civilian agencies and in industry. I do not mean to say that the training which has been provided is everything that is needed. I merely point out that it is an outstanding example of training for management at a high level in a particular area and that the war experience resulted in the extension of such training.

With respect to industry, two examples come to mind. One is the program of the General Electric Company and the other is the program of the General Foods Corporation. I think the outstanding feature of the General Electric program, which was developed toward the end of the war, is the continuous and extensive emphasis which is given to the improvement of the management capabilities of its executives.

Another management training program grew directly out of the observation by an industrial executive of the training facilities of the armed forces. The ability of the armed forces to assemble and train the great number of officers during the war convinced the president of the General Foods Corporation that comparable training could be employed by industry. Accordingly, the program for training in executive development was evolved with the purpose of providing key executives of the Corporation with a better understanding of the basic features of management. Most of the executives had specialized in one or another phase of management such as sales, engineering, production, or the like. Accordingly, the President set about to develop a program which would contribute to the broader development of the top executives of the organization.

The General Foods program has been aptly described as an appreciation program. The participants are the top executives of the parent Corporation and of the subsidiary companies. Included are both the operating and staff vice presidents of the Corporation itself and the presidents and certain other key officials of its subsidiaries. Each of these officials devotes four full weeks to the program, in four one-week stages separated by one-month intervals. During the period of participation in the conferences, the executives are established in a New York club completely removed from contact with their work and from their operating problems.

Discussion is led by selected consultants and persons within the organization, the aim being a free exchange of information and views. The first part of the course deals with executive leadership and covers such general management fundamentals as planning, organization and assignments, staffing, controlling, and leading through consultative management. The second part deals with an explanation and discussion of the specialized facilities which are available to top management. The latter includes an exploration of the nature, purpose, and use of such staff facilities as finance, law, marketing, engineering, personnel, etc.

Staff Facilities and Staff Operations

Staff facilities in any large organization are, of course, well recognized as a necessary part of management. The facilities are themselves of great value in securing improvement of management in the agencies and likewise they present their own problems of internal improvement of management.

Civilian staff units are of various kinds, among the most common being the budget office, the personnel office, the organization and methods unit, and the related administrative services. But there are other important types of staff units, which are best defined by using illustrations--such as the former Office of Land Use Coordination of the Department of Agriculture and the Power Division and the Land Utilization Division of the Interior Department. These types of staff units, as well as budget,

personnel, and organization and methods groups, are important factors in management and its improvement.

In this connection, there were some interesting developments in the military organizations during the war. Being best acquainted with the Army Air Forces, I will mention the Program Planning and Control (or Monitoring) Office and the Statistical Control Office of the AAF Headquarters. The Program Planning and Control Office had an important part in securing efficient and effective development of the Air Force Program. It played the key part in the translation of strategic policies into specific program statements and schedules which could be utilized by each major part of the Air Forces to plan and dovetail its program, in terms of kind, timing, and quantity of production, to each of the other parts of the program. It further established procedures for use by the component parts of the Air Forces for planning and scheduling each phase of the operation, and promulgated the planning factors and standards to be utilized by the several parts of the organization. There was established and used a reporting system whereby actual progress and development of each part of the program could be compared with the plan. Similarly, the progress and experience of all parts of the program could be inter-related. In its total development, the process was far-reaching and fast-moving and facilitated the adjustment of the several parts of the program to changing experience and changing condition in requirements. While I have no documented figures, I heard the Assistant Secretary of War for Air say last year that definite savings of close to two billion dollars could be directly attributed to the operations of the program planning and control system.

The statistical control operation of the Army Air Forces was another staff facility which was utilized for securing rapid and practically continuous information on a large variety of critical items, including, of course, men and materials. It was particularly interesting in that it was developed in a very short period of time and yet extended throughout all parts of the organization from the very top of the organization down to the basic tactical and supply units both within this country and throughout the world. It facilitated the planning and control of

operations in the headquarters by furnishing up-to-date information on the critical items. For example, the number of aircraft of each type on hand in the United Kingdom as of the close of business on the previous day would be available the next morning to the planning staff of the Air Forces. Decisions with respect to diversion of such craft to other theaters could, therefore, be made in the light of current facts.

Similarly, the statistical control units were utilized by the successive lower levels of command. For example, at a B-17 bomb group based in England the Statistical Control Unit had part of the same office space as that utilized by the Operations Division of that Command. The Commander of the bomb group said that he looked to and depended upon the Statistical Control Unit for up-to-the-minute information on the capabilities of the Unit and for the interpretation of both tactical and operating experience of his group.

There are others of you here present who can tell of comparable developments in the emergency civilian war agencies as well as in the old-line departments and establishments of the Federal Government. The principal point which I would like to make here is that in thinking of staff facilities we need to think broadly in terms of the institutionalized facilities which are needed for the planning, coordination, and evaluation of an agency and of its operations. In other words, what are the institutionalized facilities which are needed for better total management of an agency and of its program? The answer to this question will be found in an examination of the nature of the agency and of its operations and of its program, rather than in the utilization of some standard formula.

The improvement of management in the common staff and service units through improved organization and procedures can frequently best be secured by a joint attack on the problem by a number of agencies. Through a concurrent and coordinated study of personnel procedures, for example, it is possible to utilize the experience and thinking of a large number of interested persons to solve problems which are common to all of them. Control agencies and operating agencies have joined hands to deal with their joint problems. Examples of these

are the cooperative undertakings of the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and agencies with respect to personnel procedures and forms; efforts of the Treasury Procurement Division, the Bureau of the Budget, and operating agencies to effect improvements in the service of supply; and the work of the National Archives, the Bureau of the Budget, and operating agencies on records disposal problems.

Training conferences constitute another medium for improvement of staff operation. The budget formulation conferences sponsored by agency budget officers provide an example.

House organs or newsletters are utilized by several departments to acquaint all parts of the organization with the management improvement activities of each part.

Separately and in combination, these and other devices provide a range of techniques for improvement in and through the staff services.

First-Line Supervision and Operation

During recent years, a growing amount of attention has been given, very properly, to the improvement of management at the level of the first-line supervisor and the first-line worker. As a matter of fact, it was at this level that the Training-Within-Industry organization directed its efforts throughout the war. Everyone here, I am sure, is acquainted with the nature of that program and of its success in industry. The three parts of the program, job methods training, job instructor training, and job relations training, were also introduced into the Federal Government.

A parallel approach to improvement of management at the first level was the introduction of suggestion systems. Under the guidance of the War Production Board, thousands of labor-management committees were set up which undertook to utilize the ideas and experience of both labor and management in tackling problems of production. Many employee suggestion systems were established and thousands of improvements have been developed which have increased production and reduced operating cost. This approach to the improvement of

first-line management was likewise applied to the Federal Government, and as you know there has just recently been passed an act (Public Law 600) providing for the establishment of such systems throughout all the agencies of Government, and for making available funds for cash awards.

The Navy Department under the leadership of the Management Engineer's Office attacked the problem of improving first-line operations by making a tremendous number of detailed studies of operations throughout the Department, both in Washington and in the field. One of the interesting features of this program was the utilization of teams of analysts consisting of one organization and methods staff member and one personnel office staff member working together.

Coincidentally, work simplification programs were developed by many industrial establishments, and one of the major consultants in the field has for a number of years conducted a summer training course in work simplification to which major industries send certain of their key people for training.

The Bureau of the Budget concluded that there was need for a first-line management improvement program which met the special requirements of the Federal Government. Accordingly, after a study of industrial experience and of the special requirements of the Federal Government, a program called "Work Simplification" was developed for teaching first-line supervisors how to work out management improvements in their own units. The program used for its examples selections from the types of operations commonly found in the Federal Government rather than selections from industrial operations.

Three basic tools were incorporated in the program so that supervisors could do a full job of analysis with tools adapted to their purposes. The three major parts of the program are: the work distribution analysis, the process chart analysis, and the analysis through work count. Specific processes for analysis, including full instructions and related forms, are provided.

The work distribution analysis is actually a miniature general organization and procedural study. In the process the supervisor reviews the nature of the tasks being performed by his organization and the distribution of

tasks and responsibilities among his personnel. Through this analysis his attention is drawn to such matters as activities of questionable value and assignments not in keeping with the level of competence of individual staff members. The second part of the procedure provides for the charting of any process involving a considerable number of steps in order that the supervisor may discover through analysis how the process may be simplified, the total time of storage cut down, the number of steps reduced, etc. The third phase, the work count, shows the supervisor how to make a quantitative analysis of his operations. This type of information is useful to him in making such improvements as redistributing work and leveling the workload.

The work simplification program has a great many very important features. Of course, one of these important features is that it develops money savings and increases in efficiency and effectiveness. These money savings can be identified, and in the first year of operation of the program something over two million dollars in savings was reported by the agencies which carried on the program. Aside from these savings, however, there is a real and continuing value in teaching first-line supervisors how to analyze their organizational and administrative problems, and in developing the interest of the first-line supervisor and of the worker in the management aspects of their operations.

The counterpart of the work simplification program is the requirement for the organization and methods staffs of the agencies to deal with the more complex or far-reaching problems which are cast up as a result of the work simplification analyses. It is obvious that many of the operations which must be carried on by the first-line units are parts of processes which extend beyond the working group which is analyzing its own operations. Questions regarding such agency-wide procedures or operations must therefore be studied by organization and methods staff at a higher level. Accordingly, one of the other benefits which was looked for in the work simplification program was that of bringing the organization and methods people in touch with the first-line operations of the agency through the agency-wide problems which were tossed up by the work simplification process.

Organization and Methods Unit

The staff organized in units variously called "management planning," "administrative planning," "procedures," or "organization and methods" units warrant special mention because they have a primary responsibility for the staff work involved in securing management improvements. It is their job to identify major administrative problems and to design and assist in the installation of administrative organization structure and systems which will facilitate efficient and effective operation. It is their additional staff responsibility to provide the means for evaluating the effectiveness of operation and to participate in the evaluation. The organization and methods staff, therefore, occupy a key position in securing improvements in management.

I think it is generally recognized that the demands which are made or which can be made on organization and methods units are greater than can be met at this time. First of all, the total fund or even a considerable part of knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the doctrine and practice of organization and methods work has not been available. A search of the literature has brought out a good deal of interesting and useful material but it is not organized for ready use. Further, there are great gaps in the general doctrine and practice of organization and methods work itself and also in the doctrine and practice of the elements of management, with both of which the organization and methods units must deal.

Accordingly, because of the Bureau of the Budget's central responsibility for improving Federal management, we have undertaken to gather together the available materials dealing with this field and to relate them to a useful framework. Additional materials are being secured through synthesis, interpretation, and adaptation. Other materials are being developed through the interpretation of experience and still others will be derived from the doctrine and practices which are being identified and developed with respect to each major phase of management. Case studies are an important phase of the literature and a continuing program is needed to extend and develop this type of interpreted experience.

As an example of adaptation, I might refer to the application of one of the industrial engineering techniques to government situations. Many of the problems resulting from the huge volume of paper work in the Federal Government seemed susceptible to solution by applying a production engineering approach to them. Accordingly, a technique of analysis for use in studying this type of problem was developed, primarily by study of the experience of mail order houses and insurance companies and relating this, together with the literature on production planning, to the situations found in Government.

The two main features of the procedure are (1) organizing the flow of work to meet the requirements of the agencies for speed, economy, and quality of service, and (2) assuring an even flow of work by scheduling, dispatching, and controlling the work according to a predetermined plan. In this type of analysis a large phase of an agency's operations is studied as a whole rather than considered bit by bit according to the existing procedures involved. For example, this overall approach may identify instances where two or more procedures contain sufficient common elements to make it possible to combine them into a single flow or channel of work. Combining several flows of work produces a single large volume channel which will have less violent fluctuations than the individual flows of which it is composed; the peaks and valleys in the individual flows will tend to cancel each other when consolidated. This more even flow of work makes possible maximum utilization of manpower. Another important feature of this type of analysis is the identification of actions which involve judgment and actions which involve processing, and then of separating out the judgment type of action so that the judgments can be handled at a minimum number of points while the processing can be handled elsewhere. While these are the general objectives which are relatively well known and common, there are a number of techniques in connection with the analysis and in the design of the system which make practical the realization of the objectives.

In order to make information regarding techniques of this kind, as well as other phases of organization and methods work, available to Federal departments and

agencies, the Bureau of the Budget has arranged to provide a series of training conferences covering a period of two weeks, with full-time attendance. Some nine general subjects will be covered in sixteen sessions. The general purpose will be to give opportunity for exchange of experience and information, keeping the exchange related to a definite program which covers generally the field of organization and methods work. The conferences will be conducted under the general sponsorship of some eight Government officials who might be described broadly as departmental administrative officers.

Conclusion

In conclusion, management improvement is an objective which must be obtained through the combined and coordinated efforts of all levels in an organization. To a primary degree management improvement is dependent upon the understanding and interest of those in responsible operating positions. Techniques are available for use by all levels of management in securing improvements. Nevertheless, there are in every phase of management gaps in the knowledge needed, both with respect to the basic essentials of management and with respect to the means by which management can be improved. Accordingly, we need to improve and supplement our techniques as we go along.

And finally, the problem of securing improvements in management must be the coordinated work of all levels of management. Top management must recognize the need for and provide the incentive for securing the improvements and must follow through quickly to secure execution of worthy proposals. The organization and methods units and other staff offices must provide the capacity to identify and analyze problems and develop the process for securing a satisfactory solution. At the same time the substantive specialist or operator must participate by bringing to bear his experience and extensive acquaintanceship and knowledge in the subject field which is in need of improvement. Through coordinated action involving decision, design of an improved system, and the adoption and utilization of improved systems, the whole organization cooperates to develop the improvements in management.

LESSONS OF THE WAR - A SUMMARY

by

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The lessons of the war as they relate to public administration were not all learned during the war. This may sound paradoxical, but it is no more so than most of the lessons themselves. A few of the previous speakers in this series have referred to the paradoxical nature of their administrative experiences during the war. One of them pointed out that, in respect to clear-cut placing of responsibility and concomitant authority, the history of the war agencies merely reaffirmed on a grand scale what the textbooks on administration had asserted long before. On the other hand, in respect to such matters as line and staff and span of control, he expressed the belief that the sooner the textbooks were destroyed, the better it would be for all concerned. This reminds me of the story told by Major J. O. Walker, formerly of Farm Security Administration, about the mountaineer resident of the subsistence homestead who said he had to stay up late every night "unlarning the kids what they larned at school."

Paradoxically, then, we can be extremely proud of the outstanding record made by trained public administrators in the war effort, the greatest achievement in the annals of American public administration, and at the same time be quite humble about our vast ignorance and lack of demonstrated scientific principles in many very basic aspects of administrative theory and practice. In fact, these dual emotions are a credit to our calling, which needs more pride of accomplishment and respect for its victories, and, if the art and science are to advance, needs also a sense of humility and a scientific spirit of self-criticism which profits both by failures and by successes. Otherwise, scientific management becomes a pseudo science and the craft of administration, which calls for the highest skills of mankind, degenerates into witchcraft.

Let us look for a moment at this thing we call public administration and see how exacting a discipline it really is. It is nothing less than the art and science of mobilizing all relevant human resources for the execution of a public service mission. In an age of scientific wonders, in a complex world, and in a nation of great variety of climate, custom, and attitude, this is no mean task -- even if in the paradoxical and illogical language we use it could be called the meanest of all possible tasks. Public administration, in its highest sense, requires the highest talents, the highest virtues, the highest devotions. It must understand all the huge array of disciplines which enrich our complicated environment. It must know which of them are relevant to its several missions. It must understand how to co-opt the best services of each of them. It must evaluate and interpret the contribution that each ingredient can make and select the proportions of each which will form the components of the final distillate. Then it must blend these components into a new element which will often be unlike any of its parts, and the resultant will have to be a product so pure, so clear, and so simple that it will not tarnish or melt under the most brilliant light and heat of public inspection. The chemist who preforms these miracles is the public administrator, and I repeat that his task is one that calls for nothing short of extraordinary talents, virtues, and devotions.

As we turn now to the more prosaic details of the lessons of the war, let us not forget their relation to these high ideals of our calling. Let us remember the reply of Michelangelo to the pupil who asked why the master gave so much attention to detail. "Attention to details makes perfection and perfection, my son, is no detail."

At this point, let me say again what I have said elsewhere, that it is still too soon to make even an approximately authoritative evaluation of the lessons of war administration. This time the official history, I venture to predict, will be more enlightening than the unofficial memoirs, many of them excellent, with which we have already begun to be deluged. And, from the fragments I have already seen, I should judge that the official history will be vastly more sensitive to administrative implications

than any archives of the past, official or unofficial, because political scientists had a big hand in preparing it. Definitive appraisals, then, must await the appearance of this rich store of documentary material which will form the basis for the scholarly and scientific interpretative analysis which we all eagerly anticipate, and compared to which this lecture only can be a rough, impressionistic sketch.

I am going to divide this complex subject of the contributions of the war to public administration into six easy lessons. When I have finished I believe you will agree that many of the lessons of World War II were learned long ago, others during World War I, and still others in the roaring twenties or the penitent thirties. Let us see how well these lessons have served us and what has been added to them in the uncertain forties.

Lesson One. Decentralization of Operations

In every branch of the war effort, whether military or civilian, we unquestionably learned that high policy decision must be taken centrally, at the national or the international level, but that more than ever we dreamed possible, the execution or application of policy should be and could be decentralized to all the far corners of the wide world and to all the nooks and crannies of our own land. To those of you who work in the Department of Agriculture this is not a new principle, for over the years you have learned to apply it in agricultural education and experimentation, in crop control and price support, in conservation, and in farm credit. But in the military, industrial, economic, and scientific administration of war programs involving almost the total control and mobilization of the economy, this principle had still to be learned. Whenever it was observed, success was achieved and, equally, its disregard brought failure. Necessity became once more the progenitor of invention. As it was, too much had to be centered in Washington, and if wide delegations had not been authorized, the war effort would have floundered completely. Fortunately, both military and civilian administrators recognized this need quite early, and never has so much power been

vested in field officers. There is no denying that this vast delegation, largely to untried and untrained personnel, involved risks and was often abused. But the choice was between perfection and dispatch. While the communities and the armed forces and industry and science wanted leadership and direction from the center as to what they should do, they also wanted a maximum of autonomy in how they should do it.

The paper shortage contributed importantly to decentralized operations through limiting the production in Washington of overminute procedures covering the millions of operations that had to be undertaken simultaneously. I remember how at the beginning of the activities of the War Production Board a log jam of hundreds of thousands of priority certificates poured into Washington and threatened, for a time, to destroy the whole priority system. A centralized program of allocations and a decentralized processing of the system were instituted just in time to save it.

In all fields of endeavor, including procurement, selective service administration, manpower control, civil-service management, housing, price control and rationing, information programs, war-bond sales, salvage drives, and conservation programs, the two elements were indispensable. Until a central policy was determined the field could not act, and unless the field was given authority, too much detail washed back to the center and deluged those who should have been working on policy in a tidal wave of paper and delay. Donald M. Nelson, wartime Chairman of the War Production Board, in his book *Arsenal of Democracy* brings out very forcefully how the WPB had to learn the lesson of telling industry what was wanted and of leaving to industry a maximum of decisions as to how to accomplish the program. And according to the testimony of Speer, Nazi production chief, even authoritarian Germany did not achieve abundant production of munitions until he persuaded Hitler to lift the petty and conflicting interferences of party and central-office functionaries and give industrial managers authority as well as responsibility. Charles S. Ascher has brought out skillfully the importance of the two-way communication between central office and the field and the interesting concept of the regional office as a "transformer station" between Washington and the citizens and localities.

Two words of caution must be introduced here or this over-simplification of a principle may be misleading in its application to peacetime programs. In peacetime the development of programs at the center calls for much more consultation and advice from the field than is possible in time of war. It also calls for less executive discretion and more legislative participation. Delegation of operation to the field, moreover, does not mean abdication at the center, either in peacetime or wartime. Uniform systems of paper work and recording and accounting are indispensable to a decentralized operation. Otherwise the center loses the power of inspection and supervision and is deprived of the data and comparative information which it needs to check, not only on how well the program is being executed but on how well the central policy decisions are standing up in the hard test of experience and to what extent they require modification. But even though there is absolute standardization of paper work and reporting, it should still be possible to achieve a wide range of choice in field execution.

Lesson Two. Coordination by Staff Work at All Levels

Frederick A. Taylor used to say that staff work in the shop (which he called production planning) was always done by somebody, if only unconsciously, but that until it was identified as a separate function of top management and people of special skill were earmarked to concentrate upon it, it would be done badly. In World War II, staff work emerged from factory management and military science and was applied in every type and at every level of administration, to the very great advantage of the total result. The President of the United States, for the first time in our history, went into a war with an executive office that included staff officers to serve him in matters of budget and administration, personnel liaison, and liaison on emergency management, administrative assistants, a military chief of staff, and later an Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion situated in the White House. Economic and general policy planning, administrative and budgetary planning, personnel and procedures planning, and informational and legal planning

units were attached to the offices of all of the principal administrators of war agencies. These units performed service functions for all the operating divisions of an agency and also served its top administrator as a thinking and planning staff in improving programs, procedures, and organization.

The concept of administrative management, through the use of staff aides who greatly proliferated and extended the sphere of influence, direction, and control of overburdened top administrators, became generally accepted. I remind you of the dreaded Control Unit in the Army Service Forces, instituted by the efficient General Somervell, and of the executive office of the Secretary or executive office of the Chairman established in many departments and agencies, as, for instance, the Navy and the War Production Board. All kinds of titles were invented for these offices and their personnel, but the important thing is that through them the top executive was given eyes, ears, legs, and brains in addition to his own to help insure that problems were foreseen, conflicts adjudicated, decisions broadcast and interpreted, and the programs kept in balance.

In carrying on centralized staff work, it was found that Lesson One -- decentralization of operations -- could not be disregarded. As an example, I point to the Division of Central Administrative Services in the Office for Emergency Management, which finally had to be liquidated because it overcentralized a type of special service work that was more in the field of operations than in the field of policy.

One additional point on staff work in permanent departments as contrasted with emergency agencies may well be appended. I believe heads of peacetime departments need two types of principal staff assistants -- one to assure responsiveness of the department to new policies and programs and to political changes, and one to assure continuity of experience and leadership for the permanent corps of civil servants who have made public service their life career. At a recent conference in Princeton, New Jersey, Mr. W. A. Jump, the Director of Finance of the Department of Agriculture, suggested the title of Administrative Assistant Secretary for the top career post. I believe his suggestion is an important

contribution to the American governmental scene and one for which many of us have been waiting. But the political under secretaries who are "expendable" (as Mr. J. Donald Kingsley called them in this series) and the administrative assistant secretaries are of equal importance under American public-service conditions, to keep the delicate balance between flexibility and continuity which modern departmental staff work requires. Staff work in American governments needs a nice combination of the amateur and the professional. Indeed, Mr. Kingsley suggests some such dichotomy even at the White House level. The Executive Office of the President certainly needs staff on policy and program as well as on organization and procedure, as Mr. Kingsley pointed out so forcibly. I am sure he will find that this concept, in spite of his doubts on the point, was recognized in the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management.

Lesson Three. Coordination by Committees and Secretariats

Never before has a war required so much coordination and never before has there been so much brilliant work done in this field. The Monday morning quarterbacks, like Ralph Ingersoll in *Top Secret*, are now suggesting how it could have been done better, but the total result of what has elsewhere been called "triphibious" coordination of land, sea, and air, and trilingual coordination of English, Russian, and French constitutes, I am sure, an epic in the annals of the history of military administration.

The coordination in London and Washington, both national and supranational, gave rise to two interesting administrative devices--the interdepartmental committees of claimants and the secretariats. Both the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs were essentially committees of claimants and both utilized to a high degree the device of the expert secretariat which had developed in the British War Cabinet in World War I under Lord Hankey and in this war under Sir Edward Bridges. In the civilian agencies, both national and supranational--the Combined Boards, the War Production Board, and

War Manpower Commission, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and many others--the committees of claimants for limited resources, material and human, served by expert secretariats, became a customary device of coordination on policy and program. The staff work referred to in Lesson Two was also a coordinating device, but the introduction of the skilled secretariat which served not only a top interdepartmental board (and that is really what many war agencies amounted to), but also its subcommittees, which were junior interdepartmental boards, created a link between the administrator, the staff aides, and the committees--upward, downward, and outward.

The interdepartmental committees, like intradepartmental committees, had the limitations of liaison arrangements which are familiar to us all. By politely repressing issues and preventing them from getting to the boss for decision they often served as much to prevent differences from being resolved as they did to resolve them. But the device of the expert secretariat controlled by the front office tended to minimize this kind of thing and during the war we got more solid work and firm decisions out of interdepartmental committees than we had ever got from them before.

Coordination was also furthered through the opening of horizontal lines of communication between the various levels of different agencies. "Layering," or the vertical channeling of all interagency matters to the top command of one agency, across to the top command of another, and vertically down through its various echelons, was discouraged. Even the War Department, traditionally the home of military channels, in its reorganization order of March, 1942, specifically encouraged horizontal communications and discouraged the practice of "layering."

Of course, there were jurisdictional disputes in this last war. Often they arose from fuzzy definitions of an agency's mission and authority, as was pointed out in the lecture in this series by Bernard L. Gladieux. But in most cases these disputes were resolved before they became disastrous. There were, perhaps, less intolerance and less insularity by one service or agency of the

work and needs of others than we have had before. The coordination of programs, both domestic and international, in the postwar period can profit greatly from the war experience with interdepartmental committees and expert secretariats.

Lesson Four. The Use of Science

Scientific resources, in the form of men, equipment, and methods, were utilized during World War II as never before. This fact is well known in relation to the physical sciences; it is less well known, although equally true, of the social sciences.

In the physical sciences, through the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel and by other means, the men in the various specialties could be quickly identified. Then, by means of contracts between the Office of Scientific Research and Development and research institutions, the scientists were kept at work in laboratories they knew instead of being called to Washington, as they were in World War I, to sit for weeks detached from their equipment and unable to function.

Furthermore, enough scientific men were brought to Washington in the Office of Scientific Research and Development to help the military and civilian services to identify the areas of research needed and to select the men and institutions most prepared to come up with prompt solutions to specific problems. The acceleration of discovery through these devices has, of course, catapulted us into a new era of civilization, but the harnessing of the atom, while epoch-making, is only one of dozens of fronts on which discoveries in the physical sciences have been accelerated. The postwar period leaves us with a large program of physical research with government aid in private institutions. This research still is largely under Army and Navy auspices, and one wonders whether in peacetime the most appropriate and effective stimulation of scientific progress will be achieved under such sponsorship.

Less glamorous and less known are the contributions of the social sciences in the administration of the war. The work of the economists and of the political scientists

is better known than is the work of the other social science groups, but the psychologists were widely drawn upon in the fields of personnel testing, propaganda, and intelligence, the anthropologists in the fields of intensive foreign-area studies, the sociologists for sampling devices and opinion-polling techniques, the educators in regard to acceleration in the study of languages and other subjects which had to be taught rapidly. These are just random samples. The official history of the Office of Strategic Services, of G-1, G-2 and G-3, and of the army and of navy training courses will, I am sure, testify to the remarkable use of social sciences in the war. In spite of the hostility to professors, it was remarkable how often they were more practical than the practical men, who tended to be so practical that they lagged behind an enemy who did not scoff at exploiting ruthlessly the most refined methods of propaganda and all the techniques of modern psychology.

President Leonard Carmichael of Tufts College, former Director, National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, in a lecture last year in Chicago, gave the following example of how the Roster contributed to the mobilization of scientific manpower:

As a dramatic illustration of some of the requests made of the Roster for unusually qualified persons, I recall an order placed by the War Department for "the names of Americans who possess a knowledge of epidemiology and chemotherapy, are competent in the diagnosis and control of *Endomoeba histolytica* and other protozoan infections, have a knowledge of the Hindustani language, are skilled in the operation and use of specialized bacteriological research apparatus, and have traveled in the tropics." An epidemic had broken out in a tropical island where the United States was building a new air base. The germ-carriers were thought to be immigrant Hindus. An hour after the request was received, the name of an available and qualified person was provided, and before the day was out he was on an army clipper flying to report for duty. Of course, such complex and dramatic requests are not an everyday occurrence, but many such were received and have been filled.

There will be a continuing need for close contact between science and government in the years to come, both from the standpoint of military needs and, to a growing extent, from the standpoint of civilian needs. I repeat the suggestion I made on another occasion that a United States Civil Service Reserve of Scientists be created by the maintenance of a roster of scientific and professional personnel made up of persons who would be willing to give a certain amount of time each year to the government and who would be called in by the various departments as expert consultants. This group would keep contacts and a familiarity with government and governmental problems that would be most useful if, for any unfortunate reason, we were faced with another emergency.

Governmental contracts with private agencies for the carrying out of programs of scientific research and education have proved useful and will certainly be an administrative device that can be improved and extended in the future when the government wishes to use scientific personnel in their own laboratories and environments. Contracts have also proved valuable in education, as demonstrated not only by the wartime War and Navy training courses but also by the contracts of the Veterans Administration for GI education. They will continue to be a useful device where the government desires to assist private institutions to carry out a program which Congress has authorized. It should be recognized, however, that the contract method is subject to abuse. Just like the employment of dollar-a-year men, it is often resorted to because of the unsatisfactory level of government salaries at higher grades. It should not be used for functions which the government should perform directly.

There are other problems in the relationship of the government to scientific development. The new Atomic Energy Commission will have to embark upon a large-scale program covering both civilian uses of atomic research and defense purposes. We have begun to declassify information which is not strictly in the nature of a military secret and which should be available broadly to scientists to enable them to catch up with findings heretofore withheld. Questions of secrecy and freedom of research will constitute the big postwar problems in the

administration of government aid in scientific programs. These problems, too, will have to be solved in order that our country's predominant place in scientific advance will not be jeopardized.

Lesson Five. Citizen Participation in Government

A word of acknowledgment is due here for the patriotic volunteer work that was done by citizens during World War II. Some of them, called to Washington to serve on the hundreds of advisory committees of various types, gave many long hours of arduous labor without compensation. Notable among these were the members of the industry advisory committees of the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. These committees, organized on an industry basis, were used on problems of priority allocation, price rationing, and other economic questions. The labor-management committees and the regional committees of both the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission were notable examples of citizen service, as were the citizen organizations connected with the War Labor Board. But even more difficult front-line tasks were performed by the citizen committees that participated in the operations of war agencies in the communities. The outstanding examples in this field are, of course, the Selective Service boards in thousands of American communities, which actively participated in the operation of the draft law, and the price and rationing boards which did such notable work in achieving fair distribution of consumer goods at equitable prices.

Finally, there were the thousands of volunteers who participated in conservation programs, scrap and salvage campaigns, various types of surveys needed to further the war effort, child care, home utilization programs, Red Cross activities, and work in hospitals throughout the country. These people put in long hours of arduous duty without compensation and often without acclaim or acknowledgment of any sort.

One of the great postwar tasks of public administration is to learn how to mobilize some of this volunteer effort available in wartime for the service of the community, the state, and the nation in times of peace.

Lesson Six. Communication with Congress and the Public

Many commentators on World War II remarked that the American people were ready to do whatever was needed to win the war if the reasons for doing it were made clear to them. Perhaps the greatest administrative accomplishment of the war effort is that, in spite of the almost total mobilization it required and the very great powers that necessarily had to be vested in the executive branch, the essentials of democratic government were maintained. Legislative powers were delegated but not abdicated and Congress exercised a continuous and useful surveillance of the conduct of the war program, even though it permitted increased executive initiative because of the exigencies of the times. Agencies were created and programs were adopted at such a rate of speed that very often there was not time properly to explain their purposes and methods. But no great country in the midst of an extreme crisis ever managed so nearly to maintain its democratic forms--freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of the judiciary, civilian control of the military, and the welfare of the civilian population. No other country engaged in this war gave to its civilian population so large a share of the national product and no other country provided its citizens, through the press, the radio, and films, with so much information concerning what was going on.

I think this is a very important point in public administration, because many said when we were attacked at Pearl Harbor that a democracy could not fight dictatorships and that we would have to give up much of our freedom in order to conquer the nations which had lost theirs. As the war history gradually emerges, it becomes evident that the necessity for administrators to report to Congress and to citizens, and the freedom of both to criticize, were healthy correctives rather than handicaps. While reporting on occasion seemed arduous, and while criticisms may sometimes have resulted in delays, I think it can be said that an informed public proved to be our great strength and not a weakness. In authoritarian countries mistakes are discovered too late and there are no self-correcting mechanisms of informed public opinion, independent press, and popularly elected legislature.

Autocracies and dictatorships seem to have the knack of winning battles and losing wars. Over a hundred years ago de Tocqueville, in writing his memoirs of democracy in America, prophetically observed that the initial advantage in wartime was with an autocracy, but the eventual advantage was with a democracy which had both the criticism of the people and the element of consent and popular support in times of crisis.

During the war, administrative agencies tried new methods in their relations both with the public and with Congress. The Office of War Information and the Office of Civilian Defense were of great assistance to the various war agencies in interpreting to the public the reasons for programs that had to be adopted which affected civilian life and which were intended for the protection of the home front. Of course, publications designed for such purposes are subject to abuse unless kept within proper bounds. However, there is one aspect to this kind of activity that is usually not identified by political critics who fear that it may be used as a tool for perpetuation of the party in office. The informational agencies utilized during the war usually consisted of people who had had experience in journalism. They were interpreting governmental programs to the people through a free press. In the process of gathering their information they were capable of asking some very embarrassing questions at the very time when programs were being adopted. If these programs did not make sense and could not be justified to the American people, the very asking of these questions frequently served to improve the programs to be promulgated before they were released. In looking at the information man as a salesman for whatever product the war agency wanted to sell, we have failed to give him credit for his influence on the product that was being manufactured.

Press conferences also served a corrective purpose in the formulation of administrative policies. Press conferences were held not only at the White House but in the departments and were attended by representative newspapermen who were not slow to point out when projected rules appeared to be arbitrary, ill-considered, or unenforceable.

The function of the information man and the press conference to influence policy at its source in the government

departments and war agencies through anticipating the common-sense questions that citizens will ask needs a great deal more study than it has had. Press conferences and other information activities served as a powerful deterrent to arbitrary and ill-considered administrative action during the war, and I suggest further study, because these techniques, if not abused, can continue to be used in peacetimes as part of the democratic process of administration.

During the war, when so much authority was vested in the executive agencies, the interpretation of programs to Congress became a major task of administration. Mr. Donald M. Nelson, in the book already quoted, records that on the question of rubber alone he had to appear personally before over twenty committees of the House and Senate. I know that as Commissioner of the Federal Public Housing Authority I furnished information to fourteen committees and appeared personally before ten at various times. These appearances involved considerable preparation and added to the already heavy workload of war-burdened administrators, but I always considered them an opportunity rather than a hardship. A great many unusual things had to be done as a result of war exigencies. These hearings confronted administrators with the need for self-examination and then provided them with the opportunity to explain and justify their programs to the members of Congress, who would have to appropriate for these programs and interpret them to their constituents. Valid criticisms in the course of hearings often lead to adjustments in programs. While I cannot deny that members of both Houses at times made unreasonable and not entirely unselfish criticisms, the great majority of Representatives and Senators, regardless of party affiliation, cooperated fully with the work of the war agencies. If you had a good program, knew your facts, and presented them clearly, committees of Congress were generally reasonable. I also found that when you were wrong, you were well-advised to admit that you were wrong--that candidness and frankness in the long run inspired the greatest confidence.

A number of other devices proved particularly helpful during the war. Mr. Nelson, as chairman of the War

Production Board, established a close relationship with the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program and arranged for the assignment of liaison men to both the House and Senate to answer inquiries about war production, procurement, and priorities. In the National Housing Agency, the Administrator, Mr. John B. Blandford, Jr., arranged with Chairman Lanham of the House Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds for monthly meetings at which representatives could appear and report progress, discuss problems, and answer questions without waiting for incidents to occur that seemed to require investigation, or until legislation was requested. This was a singularly happy relationship. Chairman Lanham conducted these meetings with great skill and impartiality and invited members of the House who were not members of his committee to participate in the meetings. A new type of congressional-executive relationship has also been established in the field of foreign relations, starting with Mr. Hull's regular meetings with the Committees on Foreign Relations, followed by the designation of Mr. Acheson as liaison officer between the State Department and Congress, and evidenced most recently in the participation as delegates by Senators and Representatives in international conferences. Of course, this method will only work as long as there is a continuation of a bipartisan approach to foreign policy.

The recent Congressional Reorganization Act simplifies the committee structure of Congress. As a result, it should now be possible more than ever before for administrators, without taking too much of their time, to establish regular means of reporting to the committees of Congress with regard to their programs. I think it is important that we learn the lessons of the war relating to interpretation and accountability. Public administrators should learn to regard a report to the public through the legislature not as a necessary evil or an irksome task, but as a major part of their public responsibility in a democratic state. If such reporting can be done under the pressures of a fast-moving war and daily changing programs, it can become an organized part of our peacetime administration without, I think, in any way jeopardizing the proper role of the executive in the discharge of his responsibilities under

the laws. I believe that, interesting and thoughtful as Congressman Kefauver's lecture was, the methods I have mentioned should be developed, instead of going so far as the actual appearance of agency heads on the floor. Remember, in the American system of government Cabinet officers are not members of either House and would have no standing as peers of the members as they do in parliamentary systems.

Conclusion

This ends my summary of what seem to me to be the six major lessons in public administration learned during the war. There were many, many minor lessons, some of them of great importance, which cannot be treated in so short a lecture.

Vast new problems face public administration in the United States in this postwar period. Until world organization becomes secure, we will probably have a larger military and naval force than ever before in peacetime, with areas of occupation, bases, and trusteeships all over the globe. New problems of civil-military relationships will have to be faced. Our new world responsibilities call for not only greater responsibilities on the part of the State Department but also for better teamwork and coordination of all our departments with the State Department, the White House, and Congress--because in the modern world the conduct of international relations is shared by all agencies of government. The efforts to construct a system of world security through United Nations and its various subsidiary agencies call for a new kind of relationship between the national departments of government and the new international departments of government. In the field of veterans aid benefits, hospitalization, and education, our country has embarked upon one of the greatest administrative undertakings in its history. The problems of liquidating the war effort, of which surplus-property disposal is only one, will be with us for a long time to come. I have already mentioned the increasing problem of science and its relationship to government. The immediate and pressing problem of adequate housing is still far from solved, and no matter how

it is solved it will require a certain amount of government assistance and aid and encouragement. The fiscal problems occasioned by a vast public debt and by a budget devoted so largely to paying for past wars brings fiscal administration to a level of importance that it has not heretofore occupied. The problems involved in reconstructing a world with many destroyed cities and countrysides cannot be ignored. The solutions for still other problems, such as the prevention of work stoppages which threaten the public interest and insurance of a high level of employment, are major problems to be worked out. There are plenty of challenging tasks ahead in which political leaders, regardless of the party in power, and public administrators must cooperate to find sound solutions.

Finally, let us bear in mind that our wartime administrative experiences are not at all typical of a peacetime atmosphere. As I said at the beginning, they can be very misleading in terms of a more normal situation. In wartime all administration takes on the aspect of public administration and the whole national effort is united for a single purpose. Greater controls are imposed on the citizen and less on the agencies and much authority is delegated to the executive. In learning the administration lessons of the war let us always bear in mind these essential differences of war and peace. Let us go forward and profit by what is relevant to peace.

APPENDIX

MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES

Summary of a talk by Major General C. F. Robinson, Director, Control Division, Army Service Forces, before the Organization and Procedure Conference of the United States Department of Agriculture, October 10, 1944

The War Department is now organized into three major divisions, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. In addition, there are the theater commands overseas, which are self-contained. The Army Service Forces is responsible for such matters as the induction of men into the Army, procurement of all materials and supplies used by the Army (except airplanes), disbursement of and accounting for all appropriated funds, medical and sanitary matters, etc. Many of the old-line organizations of the War Department were made a part of the Army Service Forces when it was organized in 1942. The Army Service Forces now includes the Offices of the Quartermaster General, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Transportation, Surgeon General, Judge Advocate General, Adjutant General, Provost Marshal General, Chief of Chaplains, and the Fiscal Director, as well as the National Guard Bureau.

General Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, has said that there are five fundamental principles which must be observed if a huge organization is to be administered successfully. These are:

1. There must be a clear picture of the job to be done. For example, just how much ammunition will be required and when and where will it be needed. The job must be reduced to a concrete program and time schedules indicating what is to be done and when it is to be done must be adopted.

2. There must be an effective organizational structure.
3. There must be simple but adequate systems and methods for doing the job.
4. There must be an adequate system of measuring results achieved.
5. There must be able, vigorous, and energetic key personnel. This is the most important of all.

The Control Division of the Army Service Forces was established by General Somervell to think about the first four of these principles and see that they are put into action. In brief, the Control Division is concerned with these questions: What is the job of Army Service Forces? Are we getting it done? Do we have the proper kind of organization? And are we finding the simplest and best methods of getting the job done?

When an organization gets to be very big, if we are to know clearly the nature of the job to be done, it is necessary to determine specifically and, if possible, quantitatively exactly what is needed and then to work out a production schedule which will indicate the timing of operations. In our supply program we deal with over a million items. We have attempted to set down the quantities of these items which we need and then to establish a production schedule against the requirements. We did this also in the case of payment of allowances to dependents. How many checks were we going to have to prepare and when would they have to be issued? When we had this information, we made out a production schedule and gave it to the people responsible for this job.

After an operations schedule has been established, we need to know whether we are meeting the schedule or whether we are ahead or behind. Once a month we get reports which show for each activity the progress actually being made as against the schedule. The Control Divisions sums up these reports every month and pulls out the outstanding achievements and the things that are wrong. Each month General Somervell has a conference with his top people and goes over the report to see what has gone wrong and what is to be done about it.

It might seem that we have added a great deal of work by requiring these reports. Actually, the opposite is true. By carefully working out a reporting system which called only for information that was needed and would be used to control operations, we were able to eliminate some 5,000 other reports, many of which reported information which was not really essential or which duplicated information already submitted by other persons. Now we don't ask for any reports unless we are going to take some action as a result of them.

When a job gets big, it must be taken out of the opinion stage and put on a quantitative, factual basis--what, when, and where. If you have to make a convoy, you can't leave the assembling of the supplies which are to go aboard to chance.

Another principle of management which the Control Division is concerned with is organization. We try to find out whether our organization fits our job. We look to see whether the responsibilities of the various parts of the organization are matched by commensurate and adequate authority. We make investigations to see whether divisions and other units are effectively organized. This is something to which we have to pay continuous attention, for the situation is continually changing. We feel that we have at least made sure that every man knows what his job is, what authority he has, and who his boss is.

The Control Division has also done some work on the establishment of general policies, such as the disposition of profits from the post exchanges and the amount of stock which army posts are allowed to have on hand at any one time.

Improvement and simplification of procedures is a major function of the Control Division. Here we are concerned with methods of handling materials and papers in order to get the job done as quickly and efficiently as possible. The way we go about it is as follows. We go to the division or agency concerned, discuss with them what we have in mind, and get them to provide some people to help make a survey. We are careful to bring in someone who will have to make the new procedure work. Then we find out how the job in question is actually being done. We get the facts and then analyze them

and see what steps can be gotten rid of and what short cuts and other improvements can be made. We work up a tentative draft of the new procedure and send it to those concerned for criticism. The plan is revised, then taken out to some field installation and tried in actual practice, and then revised again. After everybody has had his say, the procedure is issued and made mandatory and a schedule is drawn up to indicate when it is to be put into effect.

To give an illustration, each depot had a different system for handling shipments of materials, with the result that we were not telling the commanding generals in the field just what they would receive and when they would get it. We worked out a procedure whereby one shipping document accompanied the equipment all the way from the depot to the overseas destination. This simplification saved about 500 jobs in the Port of New York alone. The plan was then carried further and now equipment goes all the way from the manufacturer to the fighting front on the same shipping document. We also got out a new bill of lading which helped us a great deal and at the same time reduced the work of the railroads.

New procedures of this type are written up in manual form. In these manuals we use lots of illustrations and flow charts and very little text. This type of manual is very helpful in showing people just how things are to be done.

In the improvement of methods and procedures, leadership has to come from someone other than the persons responsible for operations, for they are apt to think that the way it is being done is all right and they do not have time to stop in the middle of their daily work and undertake a survey looking to better methods. At the same time, it is exceedingly important to get the operating people to help, and that means people at the bottom as well as the top. The steps in improving methods are, first, to get the facts, then analyze these facts, if possible summarizing them in a flow chart, then work up an improved procedure and give everybody a chance to criticize it, then test it by putting it in actual operation in some part of the organization, revise it again, make it mandatory, and finally, see that it is put into effect in a reasonable length of time.

Another way of improving management might be called work simplification. Here our plan is to train a very large number of people to take some part of their job, analyze each step, and see what steps can be gotten rid of and what short cuts can be made. After a good deal of investigation, we developed a modified Job Methods Training plan of our own and have trained some 10,000 people in the use of it. In this way analyses have been made of the work of about 400,000 persons. The savings which have resulted have amounted to about 15 to 20% of the total cost of the operations studied.

We keep tight control over the number of employees needed to do the work. We get all the material we can lay our hands on to determine the number of employees needed to do a certain job. Then when we have all the information that is available, we estimate how many men are needed and make an allotment to the official in charge. He in turn makes allotments on down the line. By this means, together with the work we have done on improvement of organization and methods and work simplification, we have been able to reduce the number of employees by about 180,000, in spite of the fact that our work load has increased about 25 per cent. So we know that the system is effective. The allotment method is the only way by which we can keep the number of employees down to what is needed.

Recently we have started a work measurement program in the Army Service Forces. In private industry you have profits as a guide to efficiency; in Government you do not. We are trying to develop a method for measuring work effectively. We are trying to define work units, set a standard, and work out an effectiveness ratio which permits comparison of efficiency of output for similar operations. When this program is completed we will be able to report on the effectiveness of operations of all parts of the Army Service Forces.

A considerable part of the work of the Control Division of the Army Service Forces has been to stimulate and guide the work of control units which have been established in the component agencies of Army Service Forces and in its nine service commands. We have developed a good deal of material to assist these units, and in the various jobs we have undertaken we have usually worked

through or with the control units in the agencies concerned. In other words, we haven't tried to do the whole job at the top but instead have tried to get each agency to recognize and put into effective use the principles of good management mentioned earlier.

To sum up, what we are doing amounts to self-analysis and self-criticism, trying to find out what is wrong and what we can do to make it better. We have one great incentive and that is the realization that we have to get results if the war is to be won.

